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FOREW ORD
This treatise was prepared on behalf of The Allagash Group by
The Huron Institute of Cambridge, Massachusetts. It is based on re
search conducted during the summer and fall of 1971 under the
direction of Richard E. Barringer in collaboration with Carl H. Gotsch,
Arthur M. Johnson, and Basil J.F. Mott.
The other individuals who assembled the research materials and
developed the ideas in the book include:
Robert H. Blumenthal
Geoffrey Faux
Ronald T. Luke
Christina W. O’Bryan
Edward W. Potter
and

Thomas J. Burke
Jon F. Dawson
Michael G. Hopkins
Joanne P. McGeary
Richard E. McHugh
Otis B. Tholander

Christina O’Bryan held this revolving group together with
charm and wit and grace. Special credit goes to Carl Gotsch for
much of the economic analysis, to Ronald Luke for the land
bank idea, and to Geoffrey Faux for the community development
corporation materials. The origins of the ideas and proposals in
the book are, however, well hidden in the remoteness of the many
staff discussions and papers from which they emerged. In a real
sense, then, this book belongs to all these people.
We are indebted to the many private citizens and public offi
cials who shared with us their thoughts, experiences, and resources
in the hope that Maine would be the beneficiary. Too numerous to
name, they must remain anonymous except in our gratitude.
Without the gentle hammering and dogged persis.tance of John
N. Cole this book might never have been written. All complaints
about its existence should be addressed to him personally. Responsi
bility for its argument and content is, of course, my own.
Richard Barringer
July 1972

“Would you tell me, please,
which way I ought to go from
here?”asked Alice.
“That depends a good deal
on where you want to get
to, ” said the Cat.
Lewis Carroll,
Alice in Wonderland
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IN T R O D U C T IO N

M

aine is at a crossroads.
On the one hand, its economy is in the throes of change and the
effects are felt everywhere - inland and along the coast, in the factory
and on the farm, in every aspect of what has come to be valued as
the distinctive and proud Maine way of life.
At the same time, the very sources of the present pain point to
new and productive opportunities for Maine. In the long run those
opportunities can revitalize Maine’s economy and society on Mainers’
own terms, to the direct benefit of themselves and of their children.
But no change is without its costs. The people of Maine cannot
keep every prerogative and every privilege of their traditional way
of life and still realize the benefits of these new opportunities. They
cannot have it both ways. Nor will the choice remain forever. It is
theirs only for the while; otherwise it will surely be made for them
by economic forces beyond their present control.
And as it happens, only some new ways of doing things will suf
fice to the opportunities at hand. New ways of organizing to develop
Maine’s most precious resources —its people and its land. And new
attitudes on the part of Mainers toward themselves, toward others,
toward their land, and toward its proper use.
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INTRODUCTION

Halting steps have been taken in Maine toward these new insti
tutions and new attitudes. But even where the issues themselves seem
clear, simple and effective choices are not now available to the people
of Maine. Words defy translation into deeds and clear commitments
are denied even those villains of contemporary rhetoric, “the com
fortable few.” In fact, confusion and conflict have prevailed both
privately and publicly, and no little disappointment and even despair.
This is a book about the issues,and choices before all the people
of Maine. It is addressed to them. Its purpose is to suggest positive
measures for the development of Maine’s resources on Maine’s terms.
The proposals it contains have not been explored in every detail nor
should they have been. There is no intent here to tell Mainers what to
do with their state, but only to suggest how they might regain control
of the state’s future which has slipped away from them.
Mainers need not sit by and bemoan the deterioration of their
traditional economy and their natural environment. Nor need they
make a stark choice between the enjoyment of their surroundings and
an acceptable standard of living. Maine’s future has too often (if not
for long) been posed in just those terms. Both economically and envi
ronmentally it is the wrong choice, one that admits no solutions,
perpetuates conflict and suspicion, and frustrates the best intentions
of leadership. But it is virtually the only choice that could have been
posed in Maine’s present institutional setting. Only once policies are
adopted to change that setting will the choices themselves change.
Make no mistake, though: even if these ideas meet with enthusi
astic approval, it will still take a great deal of hard work to implement
them and realize their benefits. The notion of people and states devel
oping their resources on their own terms and for their mutual benefit
has great potential. It is a credible prospect, however, only if the
people of Maine feel free to submit personal interests to a clear notion
of the common good, to build institutions that can realize that good,
and to organize their lives around them.
These will be new institutions that belong irrevocably to the
people of Maine and guarantee the benefits of development and non
development alike to them and to all who value Maine for its own
sake. Institutions that can hammer out acceptable decisions about
the uses of Maine’s land. Institutions that will allow Mainers to par
ticipate in those decisions where they mean most —close to home.
Maine is well-equipped for the effort. Its people begin from a
personal pride in work itself, a profound sense of time and sense of
place, and an abiding commitment to the survival of one another and
their way of life. And Maine the state begins from a position outside
the mainstream of industrial America. It begins unencumbered by
many of the ills and rigidities of a society that has passed it by and
now wants and needs what was left behind. It begins with its land.

9

A

T IM E

OF C H A N G E

aine has never been a lavish provider. Even in its heyday as
supplier o f raw materials and foodstuffs to an expanding
America, it yielded a living only to hard work, perseverance, and in
genuity. And today, as the backwater o f a vast industrial system, Maine
participates more fully in the fruits o f economic bust than o f boom. From
the very beginning, Maine’s children have left for more hospitable climes,
for a better chance at the opportunity, abundance, and prosperity o f
America. Their parents wished them well. And through it all, the
land —its fields and forests and waters —returned enough in currency
and in kind to make a hardscrabble existence for those who stayed
behind.

M
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M A IN E : AN A N A LY S IS

Thus the “Maine way of life” maintained itself from generation
to generation as long as there were enough low-skill jobs in Massa
chusetts’ and Connecticut’s factories to absorb the natural growth in
Maine’s labor force; enough local activity and jobs to support the
numerous rural communities around which life was organized, and
the few public services they provided; and access for all, by purchase
or permit, to the natural wealth of the land and its harvests of suste
nance and pleasure.

Table 1. Maine G row th, 1940 - 1970
1940

1950

1960

1970

847

914

969

992

444

1087

1820

3235

31

71

238

Total State
Property
Valuation
(m illio n $)

685

819

2139

3397

Income from
Manufacturing
(m illio n $)

101

290

415

684

98

135

283

540

59

100

123

161

Population
(ooo's)
Total Personal
Income
(m illio n $)
Expenditures
by State and
Local Government
(m illio n $)

Income from
V acation/T ravel
(m illio n $)
U.S. Consumer
Price Index
(1 9 5 0 = 100)

*1969
Sources: U.S. Department o f Commerce
U.S. Department o f Labor
Maine Department o f Economic Development

468*
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Figure 1. M A IN E GROW TH, 1940 - 1970
N ote:

these trend curves fla tte n o u t periods o f reduced econom ic
a ctivity in the late 1940s and 1950s.
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Something new has happened in the last generation, however, in
Maine and the nation at large. That something is economic growth,
more widespread, rapid, and pervasive than has ever happened before,
anywhere. In Maine, as elsewhere, it has deposited a host of problems,
sensitivities, and expectations that could hardly have been anticipated
a generation ago and now defy our powers of comprehension, much
less solution.
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A few things are clear, however. First, the economic growth of
the past generation has created a problem where none existed before —
poverty. What was once an acceptable state of affairs in Maine has
become an issue about which something should or must be done —
not by just anyone looking for a worthy cause, but by government
itself.
Second, that growth has occurred to a significant extent at the
direct expense of the natural environment and the privacy of Maine’s
citizens. Where once resources might be exploited or destroyed with
out doubt of the benign consequences for man, another problem has
been thrust into public consciousness —pollution. Again, because no
private citizen possesses the array of powers necessary to dispose of
the problem, government is looked to for the answer.
Finally, the economic growth of the last generation has, by
nature’s perversity, not necessarily occurred in ways that accommodate
to the existing organization of Maine’s local governments and their
revenue base. Like everywhere else, government expenditures have
grown apace with personal income in Maine, and hence the need for
public revenues. For the most part that growth has been paid for by
property taxes, especially at the local level. And while the need for
these increased revenues has been universal throughout Maine, the
recent economic growth of the state has been not nearly so wide
spread. It has occurred in concentrations, so that a relatively few
local governments have enjoyed the preponderance of its tax bene
fits. The rest have been left to pursue revenue-raising policies that
encourage increasingly intensive use and neglect of land, its sale by
residents who no longer can or will bear the burden of its ownership,
and its development by any party who will add appreciably to the
municipal property valuation.
These three aspects of Maine’s growth —poverty, pollution, and
the pressures of growth on individuals and government alike - are
related by at least one thread that is particularly enlightening. During
the 1950s and 60s, social scientists and politicians in what were con
sidered the underdeveloped nations observed the unexpected phenom
enon that has since come to be known as “the revolution of rising
expectations.” It seems that the social processes set in motion by
economic growth —the loosening of traditional relationships between
the “haves” and “have-nots,” the widening of the narrow margin by
which most people formerly managed to survive —serve only to whet
most people’s appetites for more and to increase the demands they
make upon the government to deliver it.
Traditional aspirations or hopes, modest enough to seek some
discernible improvement in living conditions from one generation to
the next, translate into expectations that real improvement in one’s
lifetime is not an unreasonable thing. In fact, the denial of that im
provement itself becomes the unreasonable thing, a denial of one’s

A TIME OF CHANGE
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legitimate rights. And so the expectation translates into a demand for
exceptional performance by the economic and political system and
by those who would control it —the business elite and the govern
ment. For its part, government requires certain powers in the econ
omy in order to stimulate any growth at all —powers of taxation,
land-taking, resource use, currency alignment, and so on. In a democ
racy, it makes promises about its ability to deliver in return for these
powers.
Here are the makings of a vicious circle or, more properly, a
vicious spiral: in order to foster growth, the government makes com
mitments to produce; in the act of producing, it creates expectations
that it can produce more and so increases the pressures on itself to do
more, to grow more, to be more; and if it fails, it runs the risk of
denying people what they have come to see as a natural right, of
undermining its legitimacy and popular support, of turning itself out
of office and its constituency into a despondent people with “no
hope for the system.”

hat does this experience abroad mean for Maine? And what
is the key to the vicious spiral?
First, it is clear that all Americans have been as much prey in
the last decade to the revolution of rising expectations as has any
peasant in the villages of Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Sustained
by the euphoria of a generation of accumulating things and by the
rhetoric of its political leadership, the American people have come
generally to expect that all that is ugly, offensive, or objectionable
about life may be defined, quantified, categorized, and disposed
of as a “problem.” Vietnam has surely taught us that this may
not be so in international relations where we have only “marginal
levers of power” to take hold of things. But here at home, once
we turn to it, there is surely no problem that is not of man’s mak
ing and is not therefore within his capacity for solution if only he
has the “will.” (This way of looking at things, of course, assumes
that God does not exist.)
In Maine, things are different only by a degree that is probably
measured by its slower rate of economic growth —45th among all
the states during the 60s. For almost two decades now, the stock in
trade of Maine’s state politicians has been the promise of jobs and
income for their constituents - not just any jobs, but good jobs with
a decent wage, working conditions, and future. A variety of policies
were adopted and agencies created to this end and, sure enough, the
economy grew. As Mainers new and old became intolerant of the
environmental costs of growth, state policies were more recently
adopted to control these costs. Now the jobs must be clean, as well.

W
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The result is that when in 1971 a poll of Maine voters asked
“who has primary responsibility for insuring the availability of enough
jobs with reasonable pay for the people of Maine?”, their response
was: local government, 4 percent; federal government, 6 percent;
private business, 8 percent; state government, 32 percent; each of
these sectors equally, 26 percent; and all others, 23 percent.* Virtu
ally one out of three Maine voters saw state government bearing the
responsibility for precisely what their elected leaders had promised
all along they could deliver.
Not an unrealistic expectation, one might say, if the promise is
a reasonable one. But is it? Does state government in fact have the
leverage or the power ever to deliver on that promise? Is the economy
of which Maine is part something that is or can be responsive to state
government, given the tools that are or might be available to it? Or is
the promise of state government for these two decades an unrealistic
one that serves only to raise false expectations, to undermine its own
credibility, and in the long run, to disserve its interests when it goes
to the people for delegated powers that really could make a difference
to the future of Maine, its economy, and its environment?
The vicious spiral of rising expectations may be broken only at
that level where the modest expectations Mainers are most comfortable
with are reconciled with the reasonable and realistic promises of their
leaders.
What are reasonable and realistic expectations for the performance
of Maine’s economy and public institutions? There are some indica
tions available from theory and practice. Not enough to provide all
the answers for Maine, surely, but enough to light the way.

Decision Research Corporation, Wellesley, Mass, May 1971.

15

M A IN E

A S

A

ST A T E

ainers have long amused themselves that in politics, “as Maine
goes, so goes the nation.” Tables 2a and 2b indicate, however,
that in economics the opposite is true to a disarming extent: as the natio
goes, so goes Maine. In public discussion of Maine’s economic woes,
a great deal has been made of the shift in Maine’s income structure
away from primary manufacturing industries toward service-type
employments. These figures suggest that the shifts occurring in Maine’s
income sources reflect nothing more or less alarming than very basic
change in the employment and income structure of the nation as a
whole. And this proclivity of Maine’s income sources to mirror those
of the nation has not changed over time. As the nation has changed
so has Maine.
In 1970 one might have predicted Maine’s income sources from
those of the nation with 96 percent accuracy, and from New England’s
with 93 percent accuracy. In 1950 these figures were virtually the
same. (The difference between the national and regional figures re
flects Maine’s slightly greater differentiation from the New England
economy than from the nation as a whole.) What they indicate is the
remarkable linkage or interdependence between Maine and the larger
economy of which it is part. This interdependence is typical of a
trading economy built upon exports and imports of goods, as opposed
to a self-sufficient economy whose production and consumption link
ages are primarily internal.
Maine’s extreme degree of interdependence with the nation sug
gests two things. First, the best indicator of Maine’s economic future
is the national economy itself. It is the large forces and trends at work
in the national economy that set the basic framework within which
Maine operates and must maneuver for its advantage and welfare.
Second, Maine’s freedom to maneuver within that framework may be
built only upon its own natural advantages for trade. Maine is being

M

16

MAINE: AN ANALYSIS

T A B LE 2a.
Total Personal Income:
Percentage by Sourcel

M AIN E

1970

1940

1950

1960

farm

7.7

8.0

5.4

3.0

mining

(3.1

0.2

0.1

0.06

contract construction

1.6

2.4

manufacturing

22.7

26.7

3.5
22.8

21.1

trade (wholesale & retail)

10.4

10.9

10.9

10.3

4.1

finance, insurance &
real estate

2.0

1.7

2.1

2.5

transport, comm unications
& u tilities

5.4

5.2

4.9

4.0

services

5.6

4.7

5.3

6.9

government

9.9

7.9

13.4

13.5

0.36

0.49

other industries

0.22

proprietor's income
(non-farm)2

10.4

10.2

9.2

7.4

property income3

19.6

14.2

13.1

13.8

4.5

7.5

9.1

12.8

transfer payments4

1. Total personal income is th a t received from all sources
before direct personal taxes. Columns do n o t add to 100%
as they include w orker's con tribu tio ns to social insurance
programs, and exclude supplementary labor income such as
co n trib u tio n s to pensions and group insurance programs.
2. Proprietor's income measures the earnings o f unincor
porated business enterprises, professional practitioners, part
nerships, producer cooperatives, and others in self-employ
ment.

0.21

MAINE AS A STATE

NEW
E N G LA N D

U N ITED
STATES

Percentile
Change in
Share o f
T otal Income
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T A B L E 2a.
Total Personal Income:
Percentage by Source”!

1950 - 1970
1950 1970

1950

1970

U.S.

N.E.

7.1

2.4

-.66

-.73

Me.
-.63

farm

-4 0

-7 0

m ining

+.35

+.71
-.21

con tra ct construction
m anufacturing

-;06

trade (wholesale & retail)

+.27

+.47

finance, insurance &
real estate

-r19

-;1 5

-.23

transport, comm unications
& utilitie s

8.7

+.43

+.62

+.47

services

13.8

+.50

+.36

+.71

government

0.13

-.07

i2 9

-4 2

other industries

10.1

6.4

-.37

-.26

-2 7

pro prie to r's income
(non-farm )2

15.5

12.6

14.1

+.12

+.01

-.03

property income3

10.1

6.6

9.9

+.50

+.45

+.71

transfer payments'^

2.2

0.6

0.1

0.06

1.4

0.7

-.5 0

3.1
29.8

4.2

4.0
19.8

+.14

23.0

3.5
21.9

-.10

11.7

10.9

12.1

11.1

-.08

-2 3
-.07

3.0

3.8

2.6

3.4

+.31

4.6

3.9

6.2

5.0

6.1

9.9

6.1

8.1

11.0

9.2

0.24

0.17

0.14

8.4

6.2

15.4
6.9

3. Property income consists o f dividends, rental income,
and personal interest income.
4. Transfer payments are income not resulting from current
production, as retirem ent and social security benefits and
m ilita ry pensions.

Source: U.S. Departm ent o f Commerce
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carried along on an economic wave that is virtually impervious to its
influence on the nation’s terms. Only positive measures to develop its
own unique resource endowment will in the long run differentiate
Maine from the dominant pattern of economic growth in the nation
as a whole. The alternative to pursuing growth on others’ terms is to
Lead from strength on one’s own.

T a b le 2 b .
T O T A L P E R S O N A L IN C O M E
B Y S O U R C E : R E L A T IO N S H IP S

C o r r e la t io n

D e t e r m in a t io n

C o e f f ic ie n t

C o e ffic ie n t

M a in e In c o m e
A u to n o m y

(r)

(r2 )

U n it e d S ta te s & M a in e

.9 8

.9 6

.0 4

N e w E n g la n d & M a in e

.9 6

.9 3

.0 7

U n it e d S ta te s & M a in e

.9 8

.9 7

.0 3

N e w E n g la n d & M a in e

.9 7

.9 4

.0 6

(1 - r 2 )

In c o m e b y S o u rc e , 1 9 7 0

In c o m e b y S o u rc e , 1 9 5 0

C h a n g e in I n c o m e S o u rc e s ,
1950

1970
U n it e d S ta te s & M a in e

.6 7

.4 5

.5 5

N e w E n g la n d & M a in e

.8 0

.6 4

.3 6

N o t e : r in d ic a t e s t h e e x t e n t o f t h e r e la t io n s h ip b e tw e e n t h e t w o v a ria b le s ; r 2 in d ic a te s t h e a m o u n t o f
v a r ia t io n in t h e o n e v a r ia b le e x p la in e d b y t h e o th e r ; 1 - r2 in d ic a te s t h e a m o u n t o f v a r ia t io n in t h e o n e
v a r ia b le n o t a t t r i b u t a b le t o t h e o th e r .
H e re 1 - r 2 in d ic a t e s t h e a u t o n o m y o f t h e in c o m e - p r o d u c in g fo r c e s o p e r a t in g in M a in e , a p a r t f r o m th o s e
p r e v a ilin g in t h e U .S . a n d N e w E n g la n d e c o n o m ie s .

What Table 2a obscures are the severe human costs of rapid
economic change. People are not plastic creatures adaptable on ready
notice to new production requirements, nor are the social institutions
around which they organized their lives in a less frantic time not
long ago. In the short span of two decades, farming’s share of Maine’s
total income has declined by almost two-thirds, while government
employment’s share has increased slightly more. The skills required
for a livlihood in each are hardly transferrable, nor are the rewards
and satisfactions that accrue to the individual and his community
alike. While manufacturing has declined only moderately as a source
of personal income in this period, Maine’s traditional industries
have generally fared much less well than many recent arrivals that
require new skills, new life styles, new places of residence, and often
new people to displace the old.
What looks from afar like an economy in search of a new equilib
rium among its productive resources translates up close into a painful
and costly process of human dislocation and distress. That process is
not a matter of heightened expectations but of honest hardships and
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“The fine house, the beautiful harbors and islands, yes. But Maine is
a museum o f another kind, a collection o f the deserted and abandoned,
a preservation o f the feel o f long, catatonic winters. Its exhibitions tell
o f no money and nothing to buy anyway, o f nothing to do and no
place to go. It preserves the face o f lack, o f minimum, the bottom the pure, lost negative . . . With the poor, and all o f us, the truth is
found in the rusting, immovable car.”
Elizabeth Hardwick
“In Maine”

20
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real suffering. And the fewer the skills and resources at one’s disposal
—that is, the poorer one is as an individual and a community —the
more painful and costly it is. No wonder those in Maine who have
little resist blandishments to further change, to risk what remains
to support their way of life, to forego whatever opportunities
exist to make a better living for themselves. It is very human indeed,
however objectionable the results may be to others.
In 1960, the federal government’s economic forecasters pre
dicted a 50 percent growth in real economic output for the national
economy in that decade, and they came within a hair of being cor
rect. For the current decade, they have predicted about 58 percent
growth, and there is no good reason to doubt that figure even given
the current recession. But Maine, like many developing coun
tries, provides vivid testimony to the fact that growth that is tied to
a strict formula of increased productivity, of intensive use of laborsaving techniques and polluting technologies, creates at least as many
problems as it solves.
The philosophy that has dominated national economic policy
since World War II has assumed that growth itself, based upon in
creased productivity, is both necessary to economic survival and the
best index of social well-being. Its standard is per capita income. But
in Maine, as elsewhere, that philosophy has failed to cure unemploy
ment even while it has tended to distribute its income benefits to
higher income groups.
During the decade of the 60s, one hundred thousand residents of
Maine —mostly members of younger and low-income families —left
to seek employment elsewhere. The rejoinder is that a higher rate of
growth in Maine might have absorbed these persons into Maine’s own
work force. But even in that industry that witnessed the greatest amount
of capital investment and greatest rate of return in Maine during the
60s —pulp and paper —employment had a net decline for the period.
And during the years 1967 - 1970, when Maine enjoyed its greatest
growth, the number of families making over $10,000 annually increased
four times as fast as the numer of families under $3,000 declined.
On a cultural level, the notion of growth by which this nation
has so long abided is a vital element in the folkways and attitudes and
assumptions that bind the nation together as something more than a
collection of strangers. It is, in fact, among the most fundamental of
them. The idea of perpetual, unceasing growth is the firmament by
which the current distribution of goods and income is maintained in
this country: so long as the whole pie is getting bigger all the time, all
of us can expect more just by sticking around to collect it. And how
much of it each of us gets who hasn’t all he wants or needs depends
only upon his ability to squeeze whatever he can out of what he’s got
for his own.
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At present the richest one-fifth of Americans receive 41 percent of
all the nation’s annual income, while the poorest one-fifth receive 6 per
cent —barely one-seventh as much. So long as there is a distribution
of goods and income among the nation’s people that is not satisfying
to a significant number of us, one will be unable —short of oppression
—to deny the less well-off the opportunity to get ahead, to find an
acceptable standard of living for themselves. To establish their credi
bility, no-growth advocates must first pay their dues. These will be
paid only by a demonstrated commitment to a more thorough-going
redistribution of income than this nation has known to now, and to
the creation of an economic system in which all people share more or
less equally in both the costs and the benefits of economic activity.
If the Maine economy could be stopped in its tracks and sus
tained in its present state, there is enough personal income available
for each household to receive more than $9000 annually before cur
rent taxes and $6000 after, on an equal income basis. But is that
either possible or desirable? Stopping economic growth altogether
means stopping social and economic change, desirable and undesirable
alike. Change itself is inevitable and unavoidable; it is the stuff of life.
The economy converts this change into profitable, productive oppor
tunities for society. At the same time, the economy has its own mo
mentum that generates social change, good as well as bad.
The proper question to be asked therefore concerns not growth
as such, but the kind of growth that can and will be acceptable to
Mainers. The open questions are the quality of growth and the terms
on which it will occur in Maine, at what cost, and to whose benefit.
The answers to those questions are not to be found in short
term, big-bang, or quick-fix economic remedies. At any given moment
Maine is too closely tied to the larger economy of which it is part for
them to make anything but a modest quantitative difference. As
Table 2b suggests, it is only over a period of decades —as from 1950
to 1970 —that one is able to find room for Maine to maneuver as an
economic entity with independent character of its own. Only a long
term view of things provides a realistic framework within which to
consider Maine as a viable and distinctive economy on its own qual
itative terms.
What, then, can Maine do to shape the destiny of its economy
and society? Where is its room for choice in the long run?
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s the various governmental roles in our economy have sorted
themselves out in the last century and especially the last 40
years, few effective powers have been left to state government to
stimulate economic activity of any kind. States have none of the
really critical levers that may be used for this purpose by sovereign
nations, such as exchange rates to control terms of trade, tariff
barriers to protect infant industries, taxes large enough to make a
critical difference to the profit structure of entire industries, or bor
ders that control the flow of capital and skilled labor.
Further, Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides
that “citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several states.” This clause was intended
to guarantee to all Americans equality of rights that might be denied
them by states jealous of their local ways, local privileges, and local
riches. From it, the principle has been firmly established that every
American citizen enjoys the same rights to hold property, engage in
business, practice professions, and enjoy liberties possessed by citizens
of any state into which he goes. No restriction may be placed upon
“outsiders,” their freedom, or their activities that citizens of a state
are not willing to assume for themselves.
On the other hand, a corporation is legally an artificial person
rather than a citizen, and does not possess directly the rights of citi
zenship. A corporation of one state is not guaranteed the constitu
tional right of doing local business in another state. It receives that
right only by the permission or by the general law of the state into
which it goes. The terms under which corporations may engage in
business are matters which the framers of the Constitution saw as a
rightful concern and prerogative of every state government; and the
right to do business, one to be granted, denied, or rescinded corpora
tions as they do or do not meet the terms of the state and its laws.
States can therefore regulate the terms and effects of economic
activity through its chartering powers and such agencies as public
utilities commissions, environmental protection agencies, and so on.
But regulation is not stimulation, and there is mounting evidence
from the railroad industry and the public utilities that rate regulation
is as much a dead hand upon whatever it touches as it is the fabled
“handmaiden” of these industries. And whatever else it accomplishes,
regulated control of the technological processes used in production
increases production costs enough to undermine the marginal indus
tries that characterize rural areas, without furnishing employment
alternatives. Indeed, as responsible industry and civic officials are now
pressed to action by pending federal deadlines for pollution control,
it is becoming painfully clear that the technologies required to meet
legislated standards will be far more costly than anyone had antici
pated just a few years ago.

MAINE AS A STATE
At the same time, states may compete with one another for
industry through the provision of revenue bonds, tax holidays, useable land tracts, sewage systems and highways, and other like items
referred to as industrial “overhead.” But this is an increasingly com
petitive game in the United States as virtually all states pursue the
grail of a “clean,” light, “balanced” industrial base for rapid econ
omic expansion. It is what mathematicians like to call a “zero-sum”
game: with a fixed number of industries to go around at any given
moment, one state’s gain is another’s loss. And so the several states,
in pursuit of growth, intensify the competition to undercut one an
other’s appeals, with no guarantee that once the inducements offered
“footloose” industries have been exhausted they will not promptly
pick up their manufacturing facilities and locate elsewhere. It is a
strategy that, in the absence of basic appeal to industry on the basis
of lasting competitive advantage, invites economic blackmail.
Where does Maine stand presently in terms of such lasting com
petitive advantage?
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n terms of its present connections outward to large markets,
Maine stands at the very end of the nation’s line. It is the
last outpost of a region in which economic growth has lagged behind
the national average for over a decade. During the years 1967 - 71
alone, Massachusetts lost more than one hundred and ten thousand
manufacturing jobs. Farther away, New York and Pennsylvania have
had similar experiences reflecting their low competitiveness in retain
ing and modernizing traditional industries such as textiles, leather
products, and so on. Only the growth of service industries and their
favorable, concentrated mixes of high-technology industries have
kept the net downard shifts in employment in these states from
being greater.
In general, manufacturers considering the northeast find rela
tively few easily exploited natural resources, high production over
head costs for heating fuel and electrification, and high transportation
costs in for unfinished product and out to consumer markets. In
return, they are offered the inducements of low wages and tax con
cessions that further depress workers’ take-home pay after taxes. The
farther one proceeds into the northeast region, the more is this the
case, until one reaches Maine where investment in plant equipment
was one-third less than the national average for each production
worker during the decade of the 1960s, and manufacturing wages in
1969 were one-fourth less than the national average as a result.
Maine’s experience virtually since the turn of the century has
been typical of a lagging region in a growth-oriented economy. As the
natural advantages it enjoyed in basic industries such as agriculture,
leather, and textiles have been undercut by domestic and foreign
competition, its decentralized population and social organization
have run headlong into the tendency of modem, technology-based
industry to grow in concentrations. Everywhere throughout the

I
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Table 3. New England Population, Income, and Taxes, 1970
/

population \ /

Households
under
$5,000

Income
Per Capita

Population
000's

income

#

%

$

\

Households Per Capita
over
Income Growth
1 9 6 0 -7 0
$10,000
%

%

United States

203,185

3,921

28.4

35.1

76.9

New England

11,847

4,277

19.7

39.6

76.4

ft

MAINE

994

3

3,257

6

28.1

2

28.7

6

76.8

3

New Hampshire

738

5

3,590

4

24.5

4

36.6

3

67.4

6

Vermont

445

6

3,465

5

30.4

1

30.5

5

88.1

1

Massachusetts

5,689

1

4,360

2

18.1

5

39.5

2

77.5

2

Connecticut

3,032

2

4,856

1

16.1

6

46.4

1

73.1

5

24.6

3

36.3

4

75.8

4

Rhode Island

950

4

3,902

3

Note: # indicates rank among New England states
* 1969
+ measured by the share of all state and local taxes raised by the local property tax, 1969.
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Table 3. New England Population, Income, and Taxes, 1970
taxes
Total
Tax Burden
Per Capita*
$

Tax Burden
on Local
Property+

Tax Burden
Per Dollar
Income*
$

#

\

W

%
United States

1,059

.308

38.7

1,187

.317

50.0

New England

865

6

.309

3

47.2

4

MAINE

948

4

.292

6

60.5

1

New Hampshire

4

39.2

6

Vermont

931

5

.306

1,221

2

.324

1

49.7

3

Massachusetts

1,363

1

.318

2

53.5

2

Connecticut

1,088

3

.306

4

41.4

5

Rhode Island

Sources: U.S. Department o f Commerce
Maine Department of Economic Development
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world, in fact, industrial growth since World War II has generally
tended toward concentrations of productive energies and resources
that sustain themselves, if at all, through private and public reinvest
ment in themselves.
These growth centers have certain relative characteristics that
distinguish them in infancy and as they mature from lagging regions:
dense populations as a source of labor; large investments in the skills
and well-being of their people; large public investments in overhead
items such as roads, sewage systems, cultural facilities, and so on;
intricate transportation linkages to resource supplies and markets;
sophisticated production techniques and ready access to institutions
for further research and development of this technology; and above
all, perhaps, a complex network of people and institutions to gather
and make profitable use of information concerning new investment
opportunities and production techniques.
Lagging regions, on the other hand, are characteristically en
dowed with few natural resources, low investment in human capital,
little capactiy to develop technology, unfavorable location with re
spect to national markets, and local markets too small to exploit the
economies of scale in modern technology. In general, except for
specific opportunities based upon a unique resource endowment, lag
ging regions are unattractive to investors, and investment capital flows
from them to areas of greater growth.
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Surveys of the advantages of rural areas for industrial develop
ment have cited the stability and low wages of the labor force, the
availability of large tracts of land at relatively low prices, and easy
access to recreation for employees. At the same time these areas offer
small labor pools, low levels of social services, scant opportunity for
desirable contacts with competitors and supporting business
services, economically insignificant consumer markets, transportation
problems that increase production costs and delay returns to invest
ment, and the frequent mistrust of industrial growth among local
leaders and businessmen who fear its threat to the status quo of lowlevel politics and low-level wages.
All of these factors together support the general finding nation
ally that industries that have left metropolitan areas in the past two
decades have been characterized by stagnation and decline, while
healthy, expanding industries have sought out concentration for its
numerous advantages. Vigorous, well-managed firms anticipate paying
their own way in this setting, and don’t rely on inducements such as
tax breaks to make the difference in their profit and loss calculations.
Those who do —for example, many firms attracted into the Mississippi
Delta region in the last decade and not a few to Maine —have usually
failed or created one-industry towns, to the town’s ultimate detriment
through desertion or its implied threat.
By its very nature the growth center pre-empts growth in the
surrounding area or “hinterland” upon which it draws for its suste
nance of labor, capital, and resources. Its transportation network
creates a hub through which all goods flow between regions; its com
munications network and concentration of commercial and financial
institutions mean that major investment decisions for the entire region,
including the hinterland, are made there; and its accumulation of
capital, technical knowledge, and trained work force contribute to
stagnation in remote areas and their narrow dependence upon extrac
tive industries.
The growth center is a product of economic forces that contrib
ute both to the efficient production of society’s goods and to the decay
of remote communities. The investment it requires, both publicly
and privately, is so great as to preclude its occurence except where
the signs of self-generating growth and capital accumulation are al
ready present. At the same time, dynamic growth centers themselves
grow by spreading out into areas where signs of capital accumulation
and profitable investment opportunities are present. These “spread
effects” favor existing local overhead such as schools, hospitals, and,
especially, transportation systems.
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Table 4.

Maine Industrial Plant G row th, October 1967 - March 1971

Plant Expansions

New Plants
Plants
%

Region

Jobs
%

Plants
%

Jobs
%

Corridor
Southern
S. Central
N. Central

64.9
22.5
28.8
13.6

81.4
18.4
29.9
33.1

62.8
26.5
28.3
8.0

70.7
43.0
18.0
9.7

Inland
Western
Upland
Northern

15.0
10.0
0.0
5.0

5.2
3.6
0.0
1.6

20.4
5.3
1.8
13.3

20.6
4.6
0.4
15.6

Coastal
Mid Coast
Bay Area
Eastern

20.1
8.8
7.5
3.8

13.4
3.6
8.8
1.0

16.8
7.9
6.2
2.7

8.7
4.8
3.1
0.8

T O T A L GROWTH
Plants
%

Region

POPULATIO N

Jobs
%

(1970)
%

63.8
249
28.5
10.4

76.3
30.4
24.1
21.8

65.4
28.3
22.9
14.2

Inland
Western
Upland
Northern

18.1
7.3
1.0
9.8

12.6
4.0
0.2
8.4

17.7
6.8
1.2
9.7

Coastal
Mid Coast
Bay Area
Eastern

18.1
8.3
6.7
3.1

11.1
4.2
6.0
0.9

16.9
7.5
6.4
3.0

C orridor
Southern
S. Central
N. Central

l

Source: Maine Department o f Economic Development
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This is what has happened in Maine in recent years. Maine is the
hinterland of the Boston-New York area. The growth it has experi
enced to offset the decline of its traditional industries has for the
most part occurred as the result of spread effects outward from this
area. If one draws a line marking the townships ten to twenty miles
either side of the Maine Turnpike, as in Figure 4, one might imagine
a Kittery-Bangor axis or “corridor” connected to the Northeast and
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the nation by that transportation link. In 1970, the corridor area
contained 65.4 percent of Maine’s population, almost two-thirds.
Yet 76.3 percent, or more than three-quarters, of all the production
jobs created in Maine in the growth period 1967-70 were in that cor
ridor. Moreover, of the jobs created in brand new plants as opposed
to existing plant expansions, fully four out of every five were within
the corridor area. The “inland” area containing 17.7 percent of the
population had only 12.6 percent of the jobs created by growth, and
only 5 percent of the brand new ones. And the “coastal” area, with
16.9 percent of the people, had but 11.1 percent of all the jobs cre
ated. The net effect has been serious depopulation of Maine’s more
remote counties during the decade of the 60s: Washington County,
population down 9.3 percent; Aroostook, 12.8 percent; Piscataquis,
6.3 percent, and so on.
So here is Maine, an industrial hinterland in its own right, spawn
ing its very own hinterlands within the state. This is not surprising.
Except for its forests, Maine is not generously endowed with indus
trial raw materials. Unstrategically located and lacking some of the
public facilities industry requires, it offers low wages for a stable and
productive work force in compensation. At the same time, modern
economic growth presupposes what might be called a hierarchy of
growth centers and their hinterlands. Portland moves as a satellite
within Boston’s orbit; and Portland has a hinterland to draw upon
for its own sustenance and expansion as a more modest growth cen
ter.
As elsewhere, therefore, there is precious little prospect for other
than concentrated growth in Maine as far as the market forces go in
the region and nation to which it is attached. What can be done? How
does Maine take advantage of having been left behind?
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ll prosperous regions and nations once were poor. And the pro
cesses by which most grow to prosperity are not dissimilar. At
the start, a market demand exists for some commodity of which the
region has a relatively abundant supply. Purchases of that commod
ity yield income to its developers which, if they are fortunate, gets
them beyond mere survival and leaves some savings left over. The savings
are then available to spend on luxury items, to squander, or, critically,
to reinvest in the productive economy of the region itself. This rein
vestment, if successful, yields further income and savings that invig
orate the local economy and pay for the kinds of overhead that will
stimulate more and different kinds of productive activity. As the pro
cess accelerates, the region becomes a magnet to the capital and labor
that sustain growth.
Profit and savings are critical to growth, as well as the continuing
opportunity for productive investment locally. In the first instance,
however, growth is a bootstrap operation that occurs where there are
already signs of capital accumulation. The overhead, amenities, and
fancy frills that sustain growth tend only to come after those first
signs are nurtured. They come if regular arrangements have been made
to take advantage of the local resources, to see to its use in ways that
do not exhaust its supply, and to maintain private and public reinvest
ment in the local economy and society. Private investment is required
because that represents income from the marketplace of industry and
commerce, the primary institution around which we have organized
our economic life. And public investment, from taxes on income,
because there are those overhead items required to sustain growth
that no private investor or group of investors finds it profitable to under
take on their own. In the nineteenth century, these were such facili
ties as canals and schools. In the last generation they have become a
wide array of services including highways and schools. Tomorrow,
there will be other things and, surely, schools.
Most growth regions have been founded upon one or two areas
of “leading” economic activity. For New York and Chicago, the key
was their geographical location as centers of commerce and finance;
for Louisiana and Texas, petroleum; and for Massachusetts in the
1950s and 60s as its textile industry declined, the combination of
technical knowledge and light manufacturing capacity. Maine, too,
has had its “leading sectors” in the past —long timber, ship building,
pulp and paper —but none of these has produced sustained growth
for the state as a whole. In this respect, Maine’s experience may be
likened to that of the South as a whole before World War II.
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Sustained growth does not automatically follow upon profitable
activity. The key is reinvestment, the recycling of profits back into
the region. Traditional Maine and the South, as hinterlands to the
nation, generated profits for investment only into the same narrow
industrial base locally, into corporate interests in other parts of the
nation, or into other profitable investment opportunities in the
nation’s high growth areas. Locally, control of the narrow economic
base yielded control of the political system, highly favorable corpor
ate tax policies, and low levels of public investment in facilities that
might have generated more diverse economic activity.
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Today there exists the basis for another leading sector for devel
opment in Maine: the demand for its land for both industrial and
recreational use. That demand is the most significant economic occur
rence in Maine in over one hundred years, since the invention in
the 1860s of mechanical processes for converting low grade wood
pulp to paper. Whether or not that demand will be converted into
the clear opportunities it presents for Maine is presently an open
question. The opportunity is to take hold of the demand for its land
and to realize the benefits of its development for the people of Maine
on terms that are acceptable to them.
The crucial question is whether or not the institutions now
available in Maine are adequate to the task. Presently the burdens of
property taxes, of generally low incomes, and of declining rural in
dustries combine to produce the kind of willy-nilly development
that will destroy the very resource itself and the sources of its attrac
tiveness to its major market.

PRO SPECTS

FOR

GROW TH

efore we turn to the implications of the demand for Maine’s
land, it is worth considering what the foregoing discussion
portends for Maine’s overall development in the foreseeable future.
In terms of industries that produce for national markets, Maine
will continue to grow primarily in concentrated areas along the
Kittery-Bangor corridor. The only real obstacle to this growth is the
pattern of small land-holdings in the area at a time when industry
seeks relatively large tracts for development. Otherwise, producers
of easily transported products for national and international markets
will find a relatively abundant supply of low wage, high skill workers
whose productivity is above the national average.
A recent survey for a leading Boston bank indicated unusual
growth potential for the coming decade in these New England indus
tries: lumber and wood products, including furniture; electrical and
non-electrical machinery; fabricated metal products; and printing and
publishing. These are all industries that, in terms of the value of man
ufactured product, showed outstanding advances in Maine between
1966 and 1970. For example, the two largest productive industries
in Maine by this standard are paper and food, and their allied prod
ucts. Between 1966 and 1970, the value of the paper industry’s man
ufactured product grew by 24 percent, and that of the food industry
by 18 percent. During the same period, lumber products grew by
41 percent, electrical machinery by 53 percent, fabricated metals by
58 percent, and printing and publishing by 34 percent. One would ex
pect, then, that Boston bankers will show marked interest in invest
ments in these Maine industries in the coming months and years. And
inasmuch as these industries will be producing for export to the nation
and the world, their growth will naturally occur in the corridor except
where another location offers particularly favorable advantages for
production.

B
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This brings us to Maine’s other real comparative advantage for
modem industry, its deep water ports. Here the prospects are much
less clear, both in terms of what is economically viable and popularly
acceptable to the people of Maine. What is certain is that Maine has
the only deep water port capability on the east coast for handling
the deep-draft supercargo vessels now being built for wet and dry
bulk goods. At the same time, the conversion of port possibilities to
profitable port facilities with land and air linkages is an enormously
expensive proposition, one that is certain to result in their concen
tration in but one or two sites. What is most important from Maine’s
point of view is that its deep water constitutes a unique economic
advantage that cannot inexpensively be matched. It is therefore a
precious resource, the effective exploitation of which will yield sav
ings to its developers. The terms of that development, as well as a
fair share of those savings, represent a considerable part of Maine’s
leverage over its total economic future.
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The great source of demand for Maine’s land outside of manu
facturing is, of course, for recreation and leisure uses. In this connec
tion, Maine is a worthwhile investment precisely because it was left
behind the nation’s growth pattern. Fresh air, clean water, and un
spoiled land, once relatively abundant in America, now constitute
marketable commodities for Maine. And while Maine is scarcely
pristine-pure, it is still virgin by the standards of the American north
east.
Oddly, Mainers don’t care to know much about the mounting
swarms of vacationers who now visit their state each year. The result
is that no one does. Not who they are, where they go, why they
come, how long they stay, almost nothing. A few things seem clear,
though: their numbers, now 5.5 million annually or six times the
native population, are increasing at a rate of ten percent each year,
even while public facilities for them increase only imperceptibly. And
of these, more than two-thirds come to the coastal area down through
Bar Harbor, creating massive new sources of people-pollution, com
mercial and residential overdevelopment, and seasonal income for
the entire local area.
The most extraordinary thing about this activity is its magnitude,
as well as the fact that it has pushed its way into Maine by demand
forces rather than being pulled by any massive campaign of solicita
tion. Maine’s promotional efforts in tourism are at a lower level now
than they were five years ago. This is a market that has come to
Maine, bringing personal income that grew at a rate of 8.2 percent
per year throughout the decade of the 60s, making vacation travel
the fastest growing industry in Maine. Today it supplies about one of
every five dollars of personal income in Maine.
The most ominous thing about this activity is that it harbors
the seeds of its own destruction. Seventy million Americans now live
within twenty-four hours of Maine, and by the year 2000 that figure
will have grown to a hundred million. As the four- and three-day week
increase in popularity among the clean industries of the Northeast,
the pressing questions for Maine will become not whether land devel
opment for recreation and leisure uses will occur or can be profitable,
but whether the state possesses institutions and controls adequate to
keep the profit motive from literally destroying Maine’s most profit
able resource.
In their eagerness to claim its benefits while wishing away its
costs, Mainers have denied the fact that vacation travel or recreation/
leisure activity itself comprises an industry, as much as manufactur
ing or fishing, with its own general requirements, economic oppor
tunities, financial limitations, and growth potentials that are subject
to use and abuse alike. If one organizes within that industry for sea
sonal, low paying employment opportunities, that’s exactly what
one gets. And if one provides no alternative to the disorganized,
cottage industry model of every man for himself with any means at
hand, one ought not to be surprised at its objectionable results.

PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH
Experience by quality operators elsewhere in New England and
the country demonstrates that profitable recreation/leisure develop
ments are built upon intensive use of facilities in concentrated areas,
on a four-season basis. Only this kind of use realizes the industry’s
economies of scale sufficiently to justify large investments. This
means development built not upon the universal accessibility of fastfood establishments but upon concentrations of vacation homes and
condominiums, of commercial and entertainment facilities, of motel
and hotel accommodations for short and long term use. It means
both winter and summer recreational opportunities for the casual
visitor to Maine, the second-home buyer, and the host of Americans
who seek relief from urban sprawl and pleasure in rural retreat.
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The base of this industry is second-home development. Second
homes employ local labor in their construction and maintenance.
Their residents patronize local business and service facilities (to the
annual extent of about $2000 per household in Maine at present).
The multiplier effects of this spending stimulate local growth in light
manufacturing and agriculture. And perhaps as important to Maine,
these people stay awhile and take an interest in the well-being of the
local community and the preservation of its resources. *
Studies indicate that the most important factors in the selection of
a second-home site are the reliability of snow for winter sports and the
proximity of water for summer’s purposes. Inland Maine lies directly
within the most reliable snowbelt in the eastern U.S. It harbors at
least ten mountains with development potential for professional-level
skiing, scores of mountains of family-skiing proportions, and literally
thousands of miles of ready surface for the nation’s second-fastest
growing winter sport, cross-country skiing. At the same time, the 1.5
million acres of inland water in its 2500 lakes and 500 rivers constitute
63 percent of New England’s total. And while its winter snow cover
is not as reliable as inland Maine’s, the coast’s combination of non
pareil summertime resources and modest winter facilities is now being
tapped in no significant way for its year-round potential.
Maine’s limited experience in this industry suggests that the
primary impediment to profitable development is the relative inac
cessibility of Maine’s prime recreational areas. One simply cannot get
there easily. Not that hardy folk such as skiers are necessarily deterred
by distance. They came five hundred thousand strong to Aspen, Colo
rado, during the 1970-71 season, two thirds of them from out of
state. On the average, their trip took three hours by air and another
four hours by car. Maine, on the other hand, drawing as it does pri
marily upon the population of the Northeast, literally funnels its
visitors away from its vast inland resources and onto its frequently
overburdened coast. Skiing Maine may be pleasurable; but to get
there, the easiest route is often through New Hampshire and its own
excellent facilities.
The one overhead item that must therefore be regarded as a pre
requisite to the expansion of economic opportunities in Maine is access
by road, rail, and air to inland Maine’s recreational resource. This is
simply the public investment required to attract substantial private
investment to inland Maine, to establish Maine’s prior voice in how and
and where it shall occur, and to lay Maine’s claim to a fair share of its
returns.
*See Northern New England Vacation Home Study, 1966. U.S. Department
of the Interior, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Washington, D.C., June 1967.
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etween them, manufacturing and recreation/leisure indus
tries now account for two of every five dollars of personal
income in Maine. Their future in Maine, the questions of whether, wh
and how they will grow, will turn upon the availability of Maine’s land
for their use. This is Maine’s leverage over its future: a land that once
seemed limitless in its capacity to absorb man’s natural and industrial
wastes, and now is often subjected to demands that clearly threaten
its destruction. For the sake of Maine’s people, the land must be devel
oped. And for its own sake, as both a natural and an economic
resource, it must be conserved, preserved, restored, enhanced.

B

A STRATEGY OF PREFERRED GROWTH
Clearly, Maine’s present institutions are unequal to the difficult
task of melding these conflicting demands. The private market has
long since demonstrated that the profit motive alone is a powerful
but rapacious developer of land resources. Maine citizens themselves,
long accustomed to their property rights as their sole means of capital
gains, have indicated time and again their disdain for zoning devices
to inhibit overdevelopment. Maine’s local governments generally pos
sess neither the financial resources, the legal jurisdiction, nor the
professional competence to come to grips with the combination of
developmental and environmental problems they confront. And the
state agencies presently involved are structured along adversary lines
—as lawyers are wont to do —in ways that are diabolically productive
of inaction where these twin demands of economic development and
environmental protection meet.
Yet, if this analysis is correct, Maine’s unique location and re
sources decree that its future will turn at precisely the point where
land development and environmental protection meet: in order to
curb the rapacious development of its environment, Maine must
generate income alternatives - it must grow economically; to gen
erate growth, Maine must rely upon the land and its productiveness
as a leading sector for development; and in order to sustain growth,
it must maintain that land in a state of high quality as a unique asset.
From Maine’s point of view, economic development is good ecology,
and environmental protection is good economics.
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In the face of this, Maine requires a strategy to control the cost
and benefits of economic activity where the prevailing market de
mands meet its primary resource supply; a strategy built upon the
use and consumption and renewal of its lands for both manufacturing
and recreation/leisure purposes. This strategy will require no little
amount of skillful and intelligent planning: how to acquire, organize,
make available, and develop Maine’s resources so as not to destroy
them in the process; how to disperse the increasing numbers of visi
tors to Maine with minimum disruption to the local scene and life;
how to keep the profits of development in Maine for reinvestment in
both the economy and the environment; how to distribute the bene
fits of development among its wage-earners, employers, investors, and
people as a whole. The answer to none of these questions is immedi
ately apparent. They are, in fact, precisely the kind of questions that
will and should always provoke conflict and controversy. If it is for
tunate, Maine will develop institutions that can absorb that conflict,
resolve it, and implement decisions that are acceptable in the
common good and productive of the general welfare.

“The water in the harbor then must have looked the way it did now on
the offshore islands —green and sparkling, so you could see the bottom
in if a long way down . . . . Now the harbor was shiny with old oil and
gray with scum . . . . Last year the flats had to be closed to clamming
because o f the poison waste. In summer, even the flounders you caught
were soft with it. ”
Ruth Moore
Candlemas Bay
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No amount of planning is ever enough, however. Life resolves
its dilemmas in action. And economic life resolves its dilemmas in
the market. The key to Maine’s present ills is the narrowness of its
available markets at the end of the nation’s line. The antidote is to
open Maine up for the development of new markets; to relieve pres
sures that are unsupportable by providing alternatives; to put in place
the overhead that will make development possible on one’s own
terms, rather than stopping it altogether or forcing it to occur only
on someone else’s.
This means what might be called a preferred growth strategy
for Maine:
• to open one or two carefully chosen port facilities on the
coast for export and import purposes;
• to facilitate manufacturing growth along the corridor and in
those few places where a unique resource endowment makes
production profitable;
• to organize and plan markets in the recreation/leisure industry
especially that will otherwise be controlled by national operators
with large resources at their disposal;
• to restrain coastal overdevelopment for tourism;
• to open inland Maine from the south on a carefully selective
basis, both to stimulate its own growth and to relieve the pres
sures on the coast;
• to open Maine to nearby Canadian markets in Quebec City
and Montreal for both manufactured goods and recreational
activity; and,
• to keep most of Maine as it is, preserved intact for future
generations of Mainers and Americans.
An adequate strategy for Maine is only one that incorporates
the resources and potential, equally, of the inland, corridor, and
coastal regions. There is no strategy for the development of one that
is adequate in itself. To consider the future of the coast without
considering the magnetism of the corridor to manufacturing and the
potential of the inland region for relieving the people-pressures on
the coast would be shortsighted indeed. To plan the use of the corri
dor area without acknowledging the importance of its linkages to the
vast timber resources of the inland region and the deep-water poten
tial of the coast would be unrealistic. And to anticipate the develop
ment of the inland region overnight or on a wholesale basis, without
its continued and perhaps growing reliance on corridor industries for
employment, would be naive. As much as Maine’s lot is cast with the
nation, so is that of each of Maine’s regions and communities cast
with the state. Their futures are bound together inextricably by cus
tomary, legal, and economic imperatives alike.
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There is no quick-fix remedy that will easily alter the total in
come picture in Maine, or the net outmigration of its labor force and
youth. The tide of events is too strong, the current too swift. Where,
then, does one start toward the future? If Maine the hinterland is pre
sently ill-equipped to the task at hand, where does it break into the
circle of growth on its terms? How does it go about establishing poli
cies and institutions that are appropriate to Maine’s unique location
and resources, as well as acceptable to Mainers and supportive of then
own preferred way of life? Over time, the answers lie only in institu
tions that can subsume the difficult questions of growth and non
growth, of economic development and environmental protection, of
personal freedom for its own sake and personal restrictions for
society’s advantage and one’s own.
In keeping with the scale of Maine life, they should not be big
institutions. But national events require that they be strong. The size
and strength of the national economy and the trend toward corporate
mergers and concentration indicate that they must be strong if they
are to curb developments that ignore Maine’s interests and obliterate
its uniqueness.
The proposals in the second half of this paper are designed as a
system of reinforcing parts to cope with those events on Maine’s
terms. Their purpose is to attack the circle of growth at a number of
points and to admit the issue of quality into considerations of Maine’s
economic future. They are the vehicles of a preferred growth strategy
for Maine.
The proposals begin with a consideration of property taxes. For
it is not the private ownership of Maine’s land that is its current
despoiler. It is more likely the combination of Maine’s limited income
opportunities and excessive property taxes. Their burden forces de
cisions that might otherwise be avoided. Only once that burden is
relieved, if at all, will Mainers be free to take hold of their resources,
to sort out their alternative uses thoughtfully, to involve themselves
in the decisions among those choices, and to share one and all in the
costs and benefits of the consequences.
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“The barn and straggling row o f outbuildings:
were leaning this way and that, mossy and
warped: the blinds o f the once handsome
house were broken; and everything gave
evidence o f unhindered decline from thrift
and competence to poverty and ruin. ’’
Sarah Orne Jewett
The Landscape Chamber

etween 1950 and 1970 personal income tripled in Maine. At the
same time, state and local government expenditures rose from
less than $80 a year for each man, woman, and child to almost $500 —
a six-fold increase. Annual expenditures for highways - with virtually
no addition to the stock of 21,000 miles existing in 1945 - increased
seven times; health and welfare funds for a population that has grown
only nine percent since 1950 increased 250 percent; school costs,
while enrollments at the elementary and secondary level expanded by
less than 50 percent, increased more than six times; and in higher
education it was nine times.

B
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Mainers have paid for these government expenditures with their
taxes; and while their total tax burden often seems onerous, it is not
exceptional by comparison to other states. In terms of total tax bur
den for every dollar of personal income, Maine ranks right in the mid
dle of New England and the nation: third in New England and twentyseventh in the United States, at thirty-one cents on the dollar.
The crucial question for Maine’s future is not so much the
total amount of taxes raised as the measures used to raise them. The
great burden of this growth in public expenditures has been carried by
the local property tax that now yields virtually one out of every two
tax dollars raised by Maine government. Under the weight of soaring
educational costs, property taxes grew 9.1 percent a year in the
decade of the 60s. In this regard the Mainer’s tax burden not only
mirrors the plight of the property owner and renter throughout the
nation, it exceeds it by a good margin. Virtually everywhere in the
nation the local property tax is the principal source of support for ele
mentary and secondary education. Nationally, local government’s
share of the total cost is 55 percent, slightly more than half. In Maine,
however, local government’s share stabilized between 1967 and 1969
at 66 percent, fully two-thirds the cost. The difference between Maine
and the rest of the nation is made up of the other states’ greater con
tributions in support of local education.
In its spiraling excess, the property tax has become a positive
incentive to the impoverishment of Maine’s people, the despoliation
of its land, and the frustration of its leadership. For the low income
person who would keep his land, it has meant as much as ten percent
of his annual income going to property taxes. For everyone it has
meant savings to be realized by both neglect of property and its more
intensive use through subdivision and commercial development. For
most local government officials it has meant hot pursuit of industrial
and commercial development of any kind, whatever the merits of
alternative land uses. And for state officials it has meant general local
opposition to any plan to assemble the sites suited to modern indus
trial, commercial, and recreational development.
What prospects and opportunities are there for relief from this
burden? They are of two kinds, by way of revenue transfers from the
federal and state governments, and administrative procedures for
reform.
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“Fishermen have trouble making money;
then someone offers them a high price for
their shack on a point o f land. The fisher
men don’t care about the view: they take
it for granted. So they sell and move into
a trailer. ”
Cap’t. George Jennings, Camden, 1972
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irst, the matter of revenue transfers. At the federal level, Maine
government already is somewhat of a favored recipient, having
received 18.5 percent of all its state and local revenues in 1969 from
the federal government. The New England states as a whole, by com
parison, received 16.3 percent; and all the states of the Union, 16.7
percent. Under President Nixon’s revenue-sharing plan of 1971, Maine
would have received 24 million of the total five billion dollars involved,
approximately five percent of its current public expenditures. This
would not be enough to cover their present annual growth, much less
to reduce their present burden.
Most recently there has been talk of a national “value added
tax,” a form of sales tax, to relieve the property burden of local edu
cation. At the proposed level of 2.5 percent on virtually all manu
factured goods this tax would yield about 16 billion dollars nationally,
enough to relieve one-third the cost of local education if all funds
actually reach the local level. If enacted - and this is hardly certain,
as it is full of controversy in both its mechanical details and philoso
phical implications —this plan would transfer funds to state govern
ment for redistribution to school districts only in response to local
government’s reforming the inequities and injustices of local property
taxes. What is likely is that some modest level of local property tax
relief will be forthcoming from the federal government within the
next several years that is directly tied to the issue of reform: no
reform, no relief.
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At the state level, the Maine legislature passed a Revenue Sharing
Act of its own during the 1971 session, to distribute four percent of
all corporate, personal, and sales tax income to the cities and towns
by means of a formula based on population and property tax base. On
the average, this act will relieve four percent of the current cost of local
education, and three percent of the local property tax burden. While
it will increase the state’s share to one-third the cost of education, it
will still leave Maine’s local governments to pay more than 60 percent
of the cost of education from the property tax, ten percent more
than the national average.
This suggests that Maine will be hard-pressed to ignore the recent
wave of state supreme court rulings —in California, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Texas, and others —of the unconstitutionality of the local
property tax as the principal source of local education funds. These
rulings, following quickly upon the California precedent, affirm the
belief that education is the very lifeblood of our society and of each
individual’s opportunity in it. This belief is substantiated in the re
quirements for education imposed upon each of us by the state, and
by the level of expenditures we invest in education. The courts ruled
that the educational opportunity of each citizen ought not, therefore,
to depend upon anything but the wealth of the state as a whole.
Just as an individual’s address may not determine the weight of his
vote, so too ought it not to determine the limit of his children’s edu
cational opportunities.
The California decision was based upon statistical evidence from
the two communities of Baldwin Park and Beverly Hills. The numbers
involved are simple and powerful. Under standard assessment pro
cedures, Beverly Hills has fourteen times as much assessed property
valuation for each student in its school district as does Baldwin Park.
The result is that even while Baldwin Park taxes itself more than twice
as heavily as does Beverly Hills for education ($54.80 per 1000 as
opposed to $23.80 in 1969), its school district has less than half as
much to spend on each of its pupils than Beverly Hills’ ($577 for
each child as opposed to $1232). By trying twice as hard under the
present school-funding system, Baldwin Park gets less than half as
far to meet the educational needs of its children than Beverly Hills.
This same corrosive situation applies in Maine. Table 5a, or
ganized by counties, indicates that as property wealth decreases in
Maine, the tax burden generally increases even while educational
attainment decreases. Or, conversely, as property wealth increases,
the tax burden generally decreases while educational attainment
increases.

Table 5a. Wealth, Taxes, and Education by Maine County, 1968 - 69
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(as measured by property valuation per student in thousands of
dollars: total municipal property valuation for the county in 1968
divided by the number of its elementary and secondary students
in 1969.)

58

MAINE: SOME PROPOSALS

For Maine as a whole, as shown in Table 5b, the relationships
among these factors are both obvious in part and distressing in sum.
The strongest relationship is that between available educational wealth
and property tax effort: the more local property wealth is available,
the lower the tax effort that need be made to support education.
The poorer the county the greater must its tax effort be, in general.
Franklin County, with the highest property valuation per student,
has the lowest average tax rate. Piscataquis County, on the other
hand, with the lowest valuation, mounts the greatest tax effort of
all.
Table 5b.

Wealth, Taxes, and E ducation: Relationships among Maine Counties

strength and direction
o f relationship

nature o f relationship

Available Wealth
& Property Tax
E ffo rt

r = -.91
r2 = .83

strongly negative
(higher wealth *— » lower e ffo rt)
(low er wealth <— > higher e ffo rt)

Property Tax
E ffo rt & Educational
A tta in m e n t

r = -.33
r2 = .11

moderately negative
(higher e ffo rt «— > lower attainm ent)
(low er e ffo rt <■— > higher attainm ent)

Available Wealth
& Educational
A tta in m e n t

r = +.43
r2 = .18

m oderately positive
(higher wealth <— » higher attainm ent)
(low er wealth «— » low er attainm ent)

Note: r, the correlation coe fficien t, indicates the exte nt o f the relationship between the tw o
variables; the sign indicates the direction o f the relationship. r2, the determ ination coefficient,
indicates the am ount o f variation in the one factor explained by the other. The maxim um
possible value fo r each — perfect correlation — is 1.00.

At the same time, the burdensome tax rates do not generally pay
off in terms of educational attainment. Despite its top ranking tax rate,
Piscataquis stands next to last in the number of graduates it sends on to
higher education. Cumberland, sixth from the bottom in tax effort,
ranks first among the sixteen counties in educational attainment. And
Franklin County, with the lowest tax rate of all, ranks fifth from the
top in attainment. The positive relationship is not, as one would
hope, between tax effort and educational attainment, but between
available educational wealth —the size of the property base available
for each student —and educational attainment. Cumberland’s base —
and that of Franklin and Androscoggin and Knox, as well —is simply
large enough that it may tax itself more modestly while achieving
greater educational results than, for example, Piscataquis, Waldo,
Oxford, and Washington Counties.
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Relief of the burden of local educational costs is a matter that
recommends itself doubly to Maine, therefore, both in terms of social
justice —the equal opportunity of its children —and of environmental
protection - the moderate and benign use of its land. But relief does
not and should not mean assumption of the total financial burden.
For with the burden go the responsibility and the power to make
policy. And there is today more than ever good reason to keep both
fiscal responsibility and policy-setting as close to the local level as
possible. The one is still the most effective check upon educational
expenditures, while the other remains the best way to attain responsive
ness in educational policy to the wishes of those who pay the bills.
State government could meet these several objectives by assuming
two-thirds of the costs of local education that currently fall to state
and local government, leaving one-third to be borne by local govern
ment. This would, in general, at once relieve one-half the burden of
property taxes throughout Maine, by a matching grant of two dollars
from the state government for every dollar raised locally for educa
tional costs. Because no state dollars will be made available that are
not matched by local taxpayers, fiscal responsibility is maintained at
the local level by every citizen who is jealous of his tax dollar. No new
level of government is required either to plan the distribution of
these funds or to monitor their spending. And if and when events
in the area of education funding sort themselves out at the federal
level, Maine’s state government would, as one of the nation’s leaders
in this regard, anticipate relief of approximately one-half the burden
it would assume under this funding plan.
Where is the money to come from? The amount of which we
speak is scarcely insignificant —some 50 million dollars annually,
the same contribution the state now makes to local education. Are
Maine’s children and Maine’s land together worth it? If so, the
money will not come from windfall sources. Inasmuch as the benefits
of equal education and sound land use practices are truly indivisible,
to be enjoyed by all, Maine’s investment in them is properly a “boot
strap” operation to be paid for by all its citizens, each on the
basis of his ability to share the responsibility.
This suggests that the cost of limited property tax relief be borne
primarily by the state’s personal and corporate income taxes. That this
may be done without strain is suggested by the fact that the state’s
personal and corporate income taxes —each pegged at the lowest
rate among all of the New England states having them - yielded
more than 33 million dollars in 1970. Vermont, for example, with
what is considered the most broadly based and well designed tax struc
ture in all New England, has an effective tax rate of 2.6 percent on
personal incomes of $10,000. Maine’s is 1.5 percent at that income
level. During the 1960’s, Vermont ranked 10th among all the states
in personal income growth while Maine was 45th. So Vermont’s
higher income tax did not make it unattractive to growth.
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Again, Maine’s corporate profits tax rate is presently four per
cent, while Vermont’s is six and Connecticut’s is fully eight percent.
Connecticut’s fortuitous location for industry and unusual reliance
on manufacturing for income (42 percent) surely dictates much of
the difference in its rate. Yet it had the highest rate of manufacturing
growth in all New England between 1960 and 1970. The compara
bility of Maine and Vermont in their dependence upon manufacturing
income (33 and 30 percent, respectively) suggests that a corporate
profits tax for Maine more akin to Vermont’s would make no dif
ference in its attractiveness to industry. For firms with an honest
competitive advantage in Maine, it is a very good place to do business
indeed.
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f the present analysis of Maine’s economic strengths is correct,
the property tax will surely be a dynamic source of revenue for
Maine far into the future. From both a political and economic point
of view, that revenue might best be spent precisely to preserve, main
tain, and restore the resource from which it derives —the land. Pro
perty taxes to clean up and enhance the natural beauty of Maine, to
plan and implement the thoughtful, benign use of Maine land in the
interest of all its residents, are an investment in the value of every
property owner’s stake in Maine.
The property tax is wisely retained in Maine, therefore, even as
its burden is mercifully relieved. Yet no amount of simple relief will
curb its incentives to abuse.
For property tax relief from any source —state or federal - to
be effective it must be accompanied by reform of its procedures and
elimination of both its inequities upon persons and its inconsistency
with the current pattern of industrial growth in Maine. The inequities
suggest uniform assessment procedures that assure fair treatment of
those with little or no representation in local government, such as the
poor and seasonal property owners. The industrial growth, which seeks
concentration as its natural expression, clearly suggests the removal
of the property tax, its supervision, and administration from the
local to the regional level. And, one step further, it points to the shar
ing in each region’s growth of every city and town within the region.
Minnesota recently enacted a program that appears well-suited
to Maine’s current and anticipated needs in this regard. Referred to
as revenue-base sharing, it works entirely within the framework of
existing local government and distributes among them the benefits
of growth throughout the region of which each is part. By guarantee
ing every unit of local government a fixed and fair share in the growth
of the revenue base of the entire region regardless of where it occurs,
this plan makes reasonable land-use planning possible without regard
to municipal boundaries. And it goes a long way as well to eliminate
the advantage commercial and industrial interests have under the local
property tax at the home-owner’s expense.
How does it work? First, all of the present property tax base in
every city and town within the region is kept as its own, forever.
From the commencement of revenue-base sharing forward, however,
each locality retains only some fixed percentage (say, 50 percent) of
the additions to the property tax base within its borders. The remain
der of that tax base growth becomes available to be shared areawide,
among all the governments in the region. In return, the locality is
compensated with its own share in the total growth of the areawide
tax base built up by every city and town in the region. That share
is based upon a formula of municipal population adjusted for current
property valuation, so that poorer communities receive slightly more
than the more richly endowed. Importantly, all increments to the
areawide tax base are assessed on a standard, equal basis by a regional
board of assessors.
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Unlike simple revenue-sharing plans, this tax program moves be
yond tax relief to real tax reform. It achieves this without threatening
the existence of local government which, whatever its adequacy to
today’s problems, remains the only one that most Americans can re
cognize and deal with in a meaningful way. It reforms even while it
maintains full fiscal responsibility at the local level: no tax dollar is
levied by any local government against the area wide tax base that is
not also levied against its own. And above all, it gives every community
a stake in the thoughtful preservation and development of the com
mon resources on which all depend for their future.
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“Visitors remember the Maine coast as edgings o f
fine point-lace, going back, row on row, towards
New Hampshire hills or the local mountains which
come down to take a look out over the sea. They
recall it as wild evergreens, fir and spruce and
cedar and hemlock, with feathery white pines be
hind. The houses are surrounded by wilderness,
the forest comes up to the back doorsteps. They
recall the whippoorwills singing in the apple
orchard at night. It is a fact that Maine is mostly
forest still. ”
Robert P. Tristram Coffin
Captain Abby and Captain John

f tax policy is an opening wedge into Maine’s future, it is just one
element in a strategy for shaping the future to Maine’s design. Many
difficult issues remain if land use is to be the leading sector for Maine’s
economic and social well-being: how to convert the demand for land
into significant income and investment opportunities for Maine; how
to preserve most of Maine from piecemeal development, and all of it
from aesthetic degradation; how to assemble for development selected
parcels of land with great income potential; how to make the proceeds
of development available for reinvestment in sustained growth and
in pressing local needs such as housing and health care; and not least,
how to develop the many skills needed to take advantage of Maine’s
new opportunities and control their inevitable costs.
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For Maine to capitalize upon its land, it must first know. There is
no alternative. It must know —as well as it can at any moment —the
costs and effects of various kinds of land development, the mechanics
of putting them into place, the benefits that follow from their opera
tion, the techniques that may be used successfully to glean those bene
fits and to relieve their costs. It must begin the continuing task of learn
ing from the experience of its land use, of sorting out the various pres
sures upon it from present and anticipated uses, and of developing
specific remedies to cope with those pressures.
The object of that learning is, properly, the development of a
land-use plan for all of Maine’s prime development areas, especially
the inland and coastal shorelands. No single action will be more im
portant to the future of Maine. If it is effective, that land-use plan
will constrain the kinds of short-sighted development that neither
exploit the full value of Maine’s land nor return to it with interest
the value taken from it. It will provide large and small investors alike
with a climate of reasonable certainty about the acceptable limits of
land use —a climate that now is sadly lacking from Maine’s point of
view. And if it is informed by experience and by Maine’s growing know
ledge of itself, it will be a flexible, evolving instrument that changes
with the needs of Maine’s people and with the pressures on Maine’s
land.
At the same time, it is now apparent that without some agency
to serve the public’s direct interest in Maine land, Mainers themselves
will be increasingly closed off from the land even while the large
tracts suitable for modem industries become generally unavailable.
Both these prospects result from what might be called the “privatiza
tion” of Maine land that has accompanied its soaring cost and hasten
ing subdivision. Everywhere in Maine outside the vast forest holdings
of the private paper companies, the large family tracts that character
ized traditional Maine are vanishing. And as they go, so goes the access
they always provided to Maine’s fields and waters. In their place stand
increasing numbers of “No Trespassing/No Hunting” signs, and numer
ous title-holders where once there was but one. The result is that Maine
citizens are now being deprived of a heritage they feel is rightly theirs
to share. And the land tracts that are suitable for large investments are
being concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.
These developments suggest the clear need for a new institution
in Maine’s public domain that will serve as a repository for lands held in
public trust for preservation and development alike. They point to
the idea of a land bank for Maine that will act as the permanent
trustee of a precious public inheritance and plan its use along lines
of sound estate management.

MAINE LAND BANK
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hat will a land bank do for Maine? The idea is simple enough:
land acquisition, land planning, and land use in the public in
terest, on a permanent basis. The three roles complement one another
and, proceeding together, can provide a unique focus for all those inter
ested in Maine’s land, as well as a unique vehicle for stimulating limited,
controlled growth on Maine’s terms.
A land bank will, on a continuing basis, actively seek to acquire
title and rights to Maine land, and to invest those rights forever in the
people of Maine. Of primary interest will be land of special impor
tance to the economic and social future of Maine. But all of Maine is
involved in that future and is properly the concern of a land bank
charged with preserving land use options for Maine.
The basic limit upon a land bank’s ability to acquire title to land
will be its funding. Confiscation of private property, except for limited
purposes under eminent domain, is unconstitutional in Maine and else
where in the nation. The possibility exists of constitutional amend
ment as knowledge and understanding are gained of the destructive
effects of various private land use practices in Maine. That may in
fact be the only recourse if lesser incentives cannot be designed to
curb some of their present excesses.
For most of its assets, however, a land bank will be left to the
resourcefulness with which its staff pursues other, lesser rights in
Maine land and to the confidence and trust that Mainers develop in
it as an institution. Recently, for example, the state of Oregon placed
its entire Pacific coastline —from mean low to mean high water —
into the public domain, to preserve it forever from commercial over
development and to halt its steady foreclosure to Oregon’s citizens.
This action gives the people of Oregon the present and future oppor
tunity to patiently consider the many demands upon its shoreline,
and to sort them out in a land use plan that takes into consideration
the needs of all and the limits of the coastal resource.
Another example is based upon the legal device of easements —
the purchase or acquisition of limited rights in the land of another.
For more than a generation the state of Wisconsin has solicited per
manent easements on private property to secure limited rights for
planned public use. It now holds hundreds of thousands of acres
under easement for hunting, nature trails, access roads to water, flowage for rivers and streams, protection of wetlands, and so on. Other
easements, acquired in the context of overall land use planning, speci
fically preclude certain kinds of objectionable development on the
land. For just the cost of their administration and maintenance,
these are rights held forever in the name of the people of Wisconsin.
Meanwhile, the property remains in the hands of its owners on the
local tax rolls.
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Similarly, a land bank will act as trustee for lands privately be
queathed or granted the people of Maine with or without restrictions
on their use - for wildlife preservation and sanctuary, for public recrea
tion, for productive development, and so on. The central idea, whatever
the details, is to create a highly visible, credible, and permanent repository
of land that is held forever as a public trust for the people of Maine,
their welfare, and enjoyment.
The second concurrent role of a land bank is long-range land use
planning for Maine’s preservation and development. This does not mean
deciding which streets in each city and town are to be made availa
ble for commercial, industrial, and residential development. That is
properly a local responsibility. Rather, it means that there will be a
public agency charged with explicit responsibility for taking a long
term view of the inherent value and potential of Maine’s land, and for
sorting out its several desirable and acceptable usages in wilderness
preservation, public recreation, manufacturing development, recreation/
leisure communities, experimental activities like aquacultural research,
and so on. It will then be able to turn over carefully chosen lands on a
leasehold basis to responsible individuals and organizations for develop
ment on Maine’s own terms.
In practice, a land bank will do two kinds of land use planning.
First, it will be responsible for developing and updating on a continu
ing basis a state-wide land use plan that concentrates upon areas of in
tensive use, and upon the development of policies to relieve that
pressure. Those policies must and will involve certain restrictions upon
individual rights in property. It cannot be otherwise for the common
protection of Maine’s resources. One measure recommends itself, how
ever, that has had little usage to now in Maine: compensated regulation.
The trouble with zoning, as Mainers see it, is both its permanent
and confiscatory natures. It forever deprives one of full use of a capital
asset: all is lost while nothing tangible is gained. Compensated regula
tion, on the other hand, provides public payment in return for a degree
of personal regulation that is re-evaluated at regular intervals. In the
context of a socially beneficial land use plan, the private property
owner may keep his land under restricted usage in return for income,
while the public interest in his land is protected and reconsidered at
regular intervals —say every ten years or so.
These general land use considerations will lead to a second plan
ning role for the land bank: the selective opening up of Maine so it
may at once control and take best advantage of current market de
mands, and the detailed planning of sites for various industrial, com
mercial, and recreation/leisure developments.
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“It was a beautiful road: a road for health and rest and peace o f mind:
a priceless possession to be cherished and forever held in trust for the
descendants o f those who laid it out and made it possible. It was the
essence o f Maine; the gateway to the great and beautiful Maine wilder
ness to the north and east. . . . Today it is a road rich in the effluvia
o f clams in batter, frying doughnuts, sizzling lard: in tawdriness, cheap
ness, and bad taste, but in little else. ”
Kenneth Roberts
Roads of Remembrance

So long as Maine hasn’t the competence to plan selected sites
for development, as well as the capability to assemble land parcels
for their location, it will remain at the mercy of others’ limited know
ledge, limited resources, and narrow profit requirements. However,
once having explored the alternatives available; having committed itself
to the development of overhead items such as roads, airports, and sew
age systems; and having decided how it prefers to divide up develop
ment responsibility among local businessmen and larger national opera
tors who may be better equipped, Maine will be in a position to stipu
late the terms of its own, preferred development.
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With knowledge of the costs and benefits of specific sites to both
Maine and the private developer, a land bank will be able to solicit bids
from various developers and to evaluate them in terms of the standards
it would apply: environmental protection and architectural compatibil
ity; fixed rental payments for the use of the land; covenants to use
Maine materials and workmen in the construction and operational phases
alike; the quality of the development team as judged by its past perfor
mance, and so on.
In return for compliance with these terms, a land bank will offer
sites that are suitable for profitable development and protected from
commercial encroachment and overdevelopment. It will offer capitali
zation from Maine’s two guaranteed loan agencies, the Maine Industrial
Building Authority and the Maine Recreation Authority. It will provide
access to other state agencies whose cooperation and assistance will
be essential to sound, profitable development. And, importantly, it
can offer savings up to 10 to 15 percent on construction costs by
formulating its own safe building codes that make best use of current
technology.
To assemble these sites, a land bank must be invested with eminent
domain authority, for use in accordance with Maine law. In return it
offers the assurance that its land takings are invested not in private
profit but in the people of Maine; not for others to live off the land
as principle, but for Mainers to live off its income. The device by
which this is accomplished is the leasehold, the sole basis on winch the
land bank might make its lands available for any private use.
For the residential user, leasing arrangements would extend a life
estate in the property, with the certain prospect that the land and its
improvements may be passed on at will to one’s direct lineal descendants.
Otherwise, as the estate lapses, the land bank will recover the property
at the fair market value of its improvements. This policy is now
practiced in a number of federal land preserves, notably the Cape Cod
National Seashore. There, residents are well pleased with the protection
it affords their homes and their families from encroachment by the
Cape’s rapid commercialization.
From the responsible developer’s point of view, leasehold arrange
ments make good economic sense. Because rent is a tax-deductible busi
ness expense, leaseholding land for development is preferable to its out
right purchase. It reduces taxes and so increases profits. And from
Maine’s point of view, leaseholding retains permanent public ownership
of improved land and control over its future use. For accounting pur
poses, the profitability of land development today is calculated not on
return to investment forever, but only over some fixed period of time —
usually 30 to 40 years. The terms of leasing may therefore be arranged
to allow investors to recover the useful and profitable life of their im
provements. At the end of that time the site improvements become the
property of the land bank, with lease extensions contingent upon the
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current value of the land and its improvements, as well as its best cur
rent use for Maine as a whole. And all the while, those improvements
remain productive assets for income and property tax purposes in Maine.
Finally, the leasehold policy will enable a land bank to scale the
level of development activities to the capabilities of local businessmen
and entrepreneurs in Maine. Only very large corporations can today
assemble the capital necessary for land planning and development
with a long time horizon. A land bank may, in effect, subsidize local
Maine businessmen by absorbing the capital costs of long term plan
ning for them, by dividing large development efforts into locally
manageable pieces, and by giving preference to local corporations
and businessmen for their development.

f these are the benefits of a land bank, what are its costs? As flesh
takes form on this skeleton, it is unlikely to be an inexpensive
vehicle of Maine’s interests. How is it to be paid for? And even then, if a
land bank is successfully built in Maine, how is its power to be con
trolled by the people of Maine? The two questions are not unrelated.
The typical response of state governments in the last generation
to the need for overhead facilities such as harbors, airports, turnpikes,
and so on, has been to create an authority, endow it with land taking
and bonding powers, and commission it to live off its users’ fees. More
often than not these ventures have been successful in the narrow econo
mic sense: they have built and operated their facilities, serviced their
debt, and shown a profit that has underwritten improvements and ex
pansion. At the same time, that success has generally proved the source
of enormous bureaucratic power, political influence, and public dis
dain. The broader political requirements that are now imposed upon
these authorities —in terms of the increasing number of public values
to which they are expected to be sensitive —have come into direct
conflict with the narrow economic calculations upon which they built
their power —profitability, income, and jobs. The source of this con
flict is the fusion in these authorities of land use planning and acquisition
powers with direct responsibility for land development and financial
solvency. While people’s attitudes toward land use change, the impera
tives of profitability remain. And so the clash of wills and interests.

I
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To be acceptable now and to remain flexible in the future, a land
bank must not depend upon the profits of land development for its
own income and survival. Its mission is far broader than profit, and so
its underwriting must be independent of it.
In the long term, a land bank may expect to live in part off the
rental income from its leases, to pay at least for its land use planning
role from reasonable fees on the land it makes available for develop
ment. But what of start-up costs? And what of the continuing costs of
land acquisition? In terms of start-up costs for an original, creative pro
gram to deal with chronic land use problems that plague the nation
as a whole, funding is likely to be available on a limited basis from
both private foundations and the federal government. But only its
aggressive and imaginative pursuit will capture this money. For example,
in the area of federal funds for transportation and highway planning
in general - which will be needed to determine how and where to open
up the state’s resources —Maine now does the least well on a per
capita basis of all the New England states.
Again, it may be possible to involve the federal government’s
limited assistance in land acquisition, much as was done with the
Allagash Wilderness Waterway. Even more recently, the federal govern
ment purchased 547,000 acres of swampland in Florida from 21,000
private individuals and corporations at a cost of $156 million. The land
is now designated the Big Cypress National Fresh Water Reserve, and
its management permanently entrusted to the state of Florida. It will
remain forever a controlled, public recreation area open on a limited
access basis to hunters, campers, and fishermen.
Presently in Maine, as the economics of the pulp and paper indus
try change, the large paper companies are considering alternative uses
for the vast forest holdings which far exceed their demand for wood
pulp. As the recreational potential of that land grows, along with the
demand for lumber for first and second homes, considerations of its
several uses will surely become more complicated. One possible eventu
ality is that as the tax assessment on these lands increases with their in
come potential, it will become profitable for the paper companies
to present gifts of land to the state in return for lumbering rights limited
to their anticipated needs. The charitable donation will yield a savings
on their federal taxes of forty cents on every dollar value of the gift.
The cost would, in effect, be underwritten by the federal government.
Or alternatively, even now as some companies consider divesting them
selves of excess land holdings, the federal government might be ex
horted to a similar purchase to the one it made in Florida, of portions
of the last great forest land in the Northeast.
It would not be unreasonable to devise certain taxes in support
of a land bank that would be aimed specifically at tourists and vaca
tioners to Maine. They will be as much its beneficiaries as will Mainers.
Seasonal rates on the Maine Turnpike, heavy tolls on campers and
trailers, entry fees for travelers into Maine’s airports, increased meal
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and lodging fees, all come to mind in this regard. But none of these
may be levied on outsiders without imposing them upon Mainers as
well. So their application must be carefully considered beforehand —
both to clarify their impact upon Mainers and to assure that visitors
to Maine become not the hapless victims but the willing supporters of
a Maine worth working and paying for.
When all is said and done, it is Mainers, part-time and full-time alike,
who will bear the lasting cost as well as the permanent benefits of a
land bank. Its purpose is to preserve and enhance the value of all Maine
land for all time. It is appropriate that the principal burden of its oper
ating costs be borne by those who gain principally from its operation —
the property owners —and by the property tax. If the property tax burden
in Maine is significantly relieved and reformed as suggested earlier, the
cost of a land bank will be no hardship upon it. Maine’s current local
property valuation exceeds four billion dollars. Each 25 cents of tax
rate levied on that base yields one million dollars in revenue. A one
dollar per thousand assessment upon all property in Maine will yield
four million dollars annually for a land bank and its programs of land
acquisition and land use planning for all. Five dollars will yield twenty
million. And fixed at any such rate over time, its source of funding
will appreciate to meet rising costs along with the very land values
it will be protecting and promoting.
Lastly, there is the question of the control of a land bank, of its
responsiveness to the wishes of the people of Maine. There are no guaran
tees in this earthly realm. But there is experience from which to learn.
Like the Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920’s, when the Secretary of
a relatively obscure Department of the Interior leased publicly
owned oilfields in Wyoming and California to private developers without
competitive bids. A Senate investigation of the affair in 1923 resulted
in the Secretary’s resignation; and subsequent criminal proceedings yielded
convictions on charges of bribery (the Secretary) and jury tampering (the
oil company). In 1927, the oilfields were restored to the federal govern
ment by a decision of the Supreme Court.
So public accountability is the answer —accountability at every
stage of planning and operation to the people of Maine and to their elected
officials. With this in mind, a land bank might best be organized as a
elected officials. With this in mind, a land bank might be organized as a
highly visible, independent public corporation charged explicitly with the
trusteeship of Maine’s public lands. Its director would be appointed by
the governor who must account for its performance at each election
time. Its recruitment and hiring practices would be free of the encum
brance and ready excuse of civil service regulations. Its operations would
be organized both at the state level for administrative purposes and at
the regional level for land use planning purposes. Its decisions involving
resource uses would be made only after public hearings within thfe regions
involved. And councils might be established of the chief elected offi
cials in«ach local community in the region who, sitting together,
would have veto power over all land bank development projects and
land takings within their region.
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At some point in the democratic process, after all the informed de
liberation and popular participation, decision-making responsibility can
not be denied. If purposeful action is needed, decisions must rightly
(or even wrongly) be made. If a man dislikes the manner of his elected
representation, he rightly is obliged to suffer its incompetence or else
to work to remove it from office. And if a man commits his life to a
community, he rightly has a final voice in how its resources shall
provide.
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C O M M U N IT Y
DEVELOPM ENT
C O R P O R A T IO N S

“I f Americans are to be
come really at home in
America, it must be
through the devotion o f
many people to many
small, deeply loved
places. . . We are not
yet at ease with our land. ”
Elizabeth Coatsworth,
Maine Memories

here is in Maine, among those who have been there awhile,
a wisdom that is as central to their way of life as anything
else: the implicit understanding that even in his independence, man
depends for survival. Like rural people everywhere whose grip on survival
has long been a narrow one, Mainers have organized their social life and
personal relations around the certain fact that one day every man will
need his neighbor’s help to make it through hard times. Even as they
cherish freedom and independence, Mainers avoid conflict that might
strain the bonds of survival for one and all. They seek what grounds
there are to work together for mutual benefit.

T
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Today, many of Maine’s local communities are literally disinte
grating under the stresses of change. Beyond the normal, anticipated
exodus of their youth and future leadership, they now are plagued
by the demise of Maine’s traditional industries and their hastening
conversion from labor- to capital-intensive production. The dire im
pact of these events on Maine’s traditional economy, as well as its
fearful susceptibility to national recession, are illustrated in Table 6.
Many of the firms involved are unlikely ever to recover from 1971,
especially in leather and textiles where there was one layoff for every
two jobs available. The undermining effects of foreign and domestic
competition have long since paved the way for this watershed in their
history. What, then, is the future of these communities?

T a b le 6 .

E m p lo y m e n t in M a in e 's T r a d it io n a l In d u s trie s , 1 9 6 0

1960*

1970*

C h an g e, 1 9 6 0 - 7 0
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1 2 ,4 6 0

-1 3 .2 %
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+ 0 .7 %
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For its part, statewide planning and development activity can
reasonably be expected to focus only upon the large, long term in
vestment opportunities available to Maine. These will produce con
centrations of job income and tax revenues for Mainers as a whole.
But what of the opportunities for profit and development that pre
sent themselves locally as the Maine economy changes? Will Maine’s
people be able to take advantage of them? Have they the skills and
the resources to take advantage of new market demands as they
occur?
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It is increasingly clear that the forces at work in Maine’s be
leaguered communities are beyond the strength and will of isolated
individuals to cope with in ways that are at once profitable and un
objectionable. The opportunities they present demand resources that
often can come only from the organized efforts and collaboration
of many persons. Again, then, Mainers are finding that their personal
freedom to live as they will is built not upon narrow, selfish pursuits
but upon shared responsibility for a common good.
Virtually all the collaborative efforts among Maine’s communi
ties at present are found in planning agencies whose purpose is to
control the effects and meet the requirements of haphazard economic
growth, rather than to stimulate acceptable economic activity and
to maximize its benefits to Maine communities. Happily, there is a
form of economic organization that can advance precisely those
positive interests now unattended to. It is the community develop
ment corporation.
The purposes of community development corporations are the
same as those of the General Motors Corporation or any other organ
ization directed to a goal: to pool the resources of investors and man
agers and workers so they may mount larger and more efficient enter
prises than any could separately; and to make the profits of that
activity available for reinvestment in their own needs or in other
profitable enterprises, as they see fit. In this case, however, the
primary goal of the organization is not narrow profit but the econ
omic and social well-being of the community as a whole, as its mem
bers are given the light to see that well-being.
The Massachusetts Bay Company of New England’s first perma
nent settlers is an early example of the community development
concept. Its original asset was a royal grant of land between the
Charles and Merrimack Rivers, extending westward indefinitely to
“the South Sea.’’ After 1629, its charter was entrusted completely
to the settlers of the colony, each having one vote in its policy de
cisions regardless of how much he had invested in its enterprise.
Today there are successful imitations of this idea scattered
throughout the country. The Northeast Oklahoma Community Devel
opment Corporation profitably operates a precision machine shop, a
transformer repair facility, a small electrical manufacturing firm, and
an upholstery shop, while a mushroom growing business and three
more light manufacturing firms are in the planning. Another corpora
tion in Durham, North Carolina, has a modular housing plant in op
eration and several supermarkets. In Philadelphia, a community devel
opment corporation sustains two manufacturing firms, a seventeenstore shopping center, and a chain of supermarkets, as well as a
related nonprofit corporation that has put up needed new housing
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in the area. And in inland Maine a community that recently lost its
sole industry has organized to take advantage of the spillover demand
for its winter sports facilities from nearby New Hampshire.
The essential idea of this kind of corporation is the enrichment
of the community in which it is organized and the sustained develop
ment of the business and social life of the community as a whole.
This is achieved by the opportunity it provides to decide where the
profits from local development shall be allocated: to employees’
wages; to pressing social needs like housing, health care, recreational
facilities, and so on; to the expansion of healthy, profitable enter
prises; to the overhead requirements of new businesses, like research
into new product markets; to dividends on the stock held by its in
vestors; or, in the usual case, to some combination of all these.
Otherwise, it is not unlike other corporations chartered by the
state. It generally sells shares in its ownership, has a board of direc
tors and an organization that sustains its operations, pays the usual
taxes on its profit-making ventures, and is empowered to engage in
all those activities that combine judiciously to yield a profit on in
vestment. These normally include the powers to buy, sell, lease, and
develop land, to borrow capital, to operate enterprises, to enter part
nerships, to create subsidiary corporations, and so on.
As a particular kind of corporation, however, the community
development corporation has unique features. As a community en
tity, it is a corporation based primarily in one geographic area with
control of its policy decisions vested primarily in the residents of
that area. Whatever form the community development corporation
takes in practice - and there are several possible —two features of
its organization are basic to its design. The first is that majority con
trol of the policy making apparatus of the corporation —its board
of directors —is vested in the residents of the community itself. If
the corporation is to serve their interests, for better or worse, it can
be no other way. This is the source of its accountability and its re
sponsiveness. Second, votes among stockholders in the corporation
on matters to which they are privy —such as the election of officers are distributed on a one man-one vote basis, regardless of the size of
one’s stockholdings. If the corporation is to engage the loyalty and
interests of the individual members of the community, it can be no
other way. This is the source of its support and its strength.
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ow does a community development corporation work in prac
tice to achieve these objectives, at once novel and ancient?
Typically, the successful community development corporation is organi
zed as a private corporation to engage in profitable activities. (Its non
profit acitvities —such as a community hospital or recreation center —are
organized and operated through a related nonprofit organization.)
The corporation sells stock in its ownership which anyone may pur
chase at a modest cost. In both the Oklahoma and North Carolina
examples mentioned earlier, common stock is sold at five dollars a
share. The stockholders then elect the corporation’s board of direc
tors who, in turn, select its full time chief executive, approve and
disapprove its investment decisions, and set general policy for the
corporation. The executive director is responsible for overseeing the
daily operations of the corporation and for its staffing, including
persons with the technical skills to plan profitable businesses and
assemble financing for them. Each business operation that is launched
has its own management distinct from the development corporation
itself.
All of this, of course, sounds very much like the structure of
any modest business development enterprise. The crucial difference
is at the stock purchase and directors’ election stages. There, stock
is divided into class A and class B varieties, possibly pegged at dif
ferent market values. Class A stock is available only to residents of
the community in which the corporation is organized, and its holders
elect, say, two-thirds of the board of directors. Class B stock, avail
able to anyone inside or outside the community, elects one third of
the board of directors and has first claim on stock dividends declared
by the corporation. Thus, control of at least a majority of the board
of directors of the corporation is retained by the members of the
community on a one man-one vote basis, while a reasonable incentive
is maintained for larger investments in the corporation’s profitable
activities by insiders and outsiders alike. Control over the all-impor
tant decisions concerning reinvestment of profits stays within the
local community.
What, then, does a community development corporation do in
practice? First, it does feasibility and planning studies to identify
specific investment opportunities and profitable enterprises. Service
facilities, manufacturing plants, commercial enterprises, and so on —
all are eligible. Having selected an appropriate site, the corporation
arranges financing for development and operation of the enterprise.
It locates local individuals and organizations to participate in the
development and its operation. It organizes the training of individ
uals who will be responsible for its operation. It selects contractors
and subcontractors for the development stage and oversees the con
struction. And when the business is in place, the corporation is re
sponsible for operating it or for turning it over to another operator,
keeping a share of the equity for itself as credit capital for future
operations.
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Thus, the businesses of a community development corporation
may be owned wholly or in part by its investors. It may enter part
nerships with local private developers or even national ones to assume
the burden and responsibility of parts of the operation they are better
equipped to handle —the construction of a specialized plant, the
construction and operation of the motel end of a marina-summer
resort complex, and so on. Or it may choose to sell or rent its retail
sites and operations to independent local businessmen to encourage
their growth. The possibilities are no less than those available to any
well-managed, imaginative development corporation. The limits are
its resources of experience, competence, and funding. With the
gathering momentum of those resources, however, the community
development corporation becomes a focus for investment capital,
entrepreneurial talents, and productive ideas within the local com
munity, an organizing vehicle for opportunities that otherwise remain
unavailable to it.
What opportunities are available for community development
corporations in Maine? Large development projects would be inap
propriate for them to start with. Yet the prospect that Maine’s future
is inextricably linked to the demand for four season recreation/leisure
facilities and for industrial and commercial sites suggests that com
munity development corporations start from them as one base of
their competence and resources. Even if modestly at first, they can
translate those demands into locally owned and operated service and
recreational facilities of all kinds, and into locally owned and con
trolled land tracts for commercial development.
At the same time, Maine’s limited local markets and resources
recommend the community development corporation as the vehicle
for local manufacturing industries and handicrafts; for buyer and
consumer cooperatives in farming, fishing, and elsewhere; for experi
mental enterprises such as aquacultural research and cattle farming,
which is now enjoying a renaissance in New York state for local and
regional markets; and so on.
In each of these areas the community corporation can increase
normal returns to investment by taking advantage of the profits of
“vertical integration.” Local manufacturing industries, handicrafts,
and farming, for example, are everywhere handicapped in their de
velopment by the separation of processing and marketing operations
from the original product manufacture or harvest. No product
reaches the consumer without having passed through these inter
mediate stages, and most often the greatest price mark-up and profit
are realized there. Community development corporations can take
advantage of those profits for their members by planning projects
from the start that integrate processing and marketing techniques
into their operation.
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f community development corporations are appropriate
to Maine’s character and opportunities, two compelling ques
tions remain: at what level within the Maine community would they
best be organized; and how are they to be financed?
For the most part, the development of Maine’s resources will
be accomplished by private individuals and corporations acting in
their own behalf within the limits laid down by Maine’s law and reg
ulatory agencies. If the community development concept is to be
successful on its own terms, it is critical that its organization and
financial structure be soundly based in Maine’s economic, environ
mental, and fiscal realities. Community development corporations
that fail generally do so for lack of managerial competence and ade
quate technical skills in business planning and finance. It would be
imprudent to dilute the limited pool of skills Maine has in these areas
too thin for effect.
Similarly, it is important that community development corpora
tions in Maine be organized along lines that generally absorb the en
vironmental considerations involved in their operation. Those con
siderations, from any manageable planning perspective, are regional
rather than local in nature.
Finally, the social and economic problems of Maine’s commun
ities —jobs, housing, pollution control, education, transportation,
and so on —scarcely respect local boundaries. Nor do the opportun
ities for jobs and income that avail themselves in a changing Maine
economy. Community investment and reinvestment decisions will best
be made, then, if they are informed by the needs and interests of
Mainers that exist irrespective of narrow local boundaries.
Each of these considerations suggests that Maine’s community
development corporations be organized basically along regional lines,
with allowance for the regional corporations to devolve specific op
portunities onto local corporations as they arise. Just where they
are organized, along what specific lines, is a matter properly left to
Mainers themselves, to their sense of the identities of interest within
Maine’s geography, to their preferences about how and where to
invest their resources, and to their prejudices about what kinds of
resource development are acceptable to themselves.
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And how are these institutions to be financed? In the long run,
community development corporations may only be considered boot
strap operations —the result of community efforts to employ their
own resources and skills in ways that will sustain the community as
a healthy, viable, independent entity. Within a matter of a few years
after its establishment a community corporation must be expected
to show a profit and, over time, to support itself from the profits on
its operations. It is not a charity but a vehicle for putting resources
to work to generate and sustain economic growth where it is needed
and wanted.
But what of start-up costs? How is it to get off the ground and
pay for its staff salaries and up-front investment and operating costs?
Presently there is little alternative to a grant or its equivalent to sus
tain the planning and feasibility studies necessary before any operating
venture is undertaken. Limited funds are now available from both
the federal government and the large private foundations to support
nascent community development projects, though hardly on a mas
sive scale. The Ford Foundation has spent five million dollars a year
of late on community economic development projects around the
nation, and is about to increase that commitment to twelve to fifteen
million dollars annually. At the federal level, several bills have recently
been introduced in the Congress to establish urban and rural devel
opment banks in support of community-based businesses. The im
petus for them is the decay that now characterizes all of America’s
central cities and rural areas. The short term prospects for these bills
are uncertain, though the distant prospects are more promising.
The stock offerings mentioned earlier will constitute a modest
source of operating funds for the development corporation. At the
same time, they are a very visible and dramatic opportunity for
Maine’s summer residents to invest directly in the economic health
of their own Maine communities. Debentures might be sold —obliga
tions against future profits —and possibly even municipal bonds,
offered by consortiums of the local communities involved in support
of their own regional development enterprises. Other sources of
credit in Maine include the loan guarantees of the Maine Industrial
Building Authority and the Maine Recreation Authority; the Devel
opment Credit Corporation of Maine, a moribund credit pool among
Maine’s private lending institutions in support of small business; and
the Small Business Administration and the Economic Development
Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
All of these agencies might be tapped to get more favorable
terms of credit than might be available to a strictly private developer
operating in Maine. This is necessary, inasmuch as the return to in
vestment in a community development corporation is lowered at
first by the breadth of the economic and social goals it embraces.
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There is a cost attaching to learning and experience, to preference
for local materials, to training unskilled persons for new employ
ments, to the non-exploitive use of land and aesthetic design of its
improvements. In dollar terms that cost translates into lower return
to investment in the short run and community strength and stability
in the long run.
Given these long term advantages, it is in the interest of Maine’s
government to promote community economic development efforts,
not so much in cash as in kind. For even before there is the prospect
of profitable activity by a community development corporation
there is the requirement for organizational assistance, for technical
assistance, for planning assistance, for marketing assistance, for all
the many skills that contribute to the planning and organization of
any profitable economic venture. Without them, no community devel
opment effort can get off the ground.
This suggests that the state’s Department of Commerce and
Industry develop a program of technical and financial assistance to
community development enterprises on a priority basis, just as it
now provides this assistance to all businesses considering location in
Maine. This Department is the product of Maine’s recent adminis
trative reorganization and includes the several agencies most perti
nent to community development efforts: the State Technical Services
Program, the Maine Industrial Building Authority, and the Maine
Recreation Authority.
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A Maine community development agency might draw upon and
coordinate their resources, at first to provide planning assistance and
seed money to community development corporations and, over time,
to create an investment pool or development bank specifically geared
to their particular financial requirements. Meanwhile, this agency
would become a repository of Maine’s and other states’ growing ex
perience with community enterprises, their funding sources, exper
ience in different ventures, and so on. And just as important, it
would be the community corporation’s advocate within government
for breaking through red tape and establishing the coordination
among agencies that is essential to any successful land development
project today.
Not the least important of those agencies might, of course, be
a land bank. The sources of possible collaboration between it and
the community development corporations are many, indeed:
technical assistance in land use planning, assistance in site selection
and land acquisition, partnership on specific development projects,
leasehold agreements on land sites that reflect the financial constraints
of community corporations, and so on. Together —the one creating
income and investment opportunities for Maine and scaling them to
manageable size for Maine businesses, the other undertaking some of
their development on behalf of Maine’s communities —a land bank
and community development corporations might become strong
partners in Maine’s future on its own terms.
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“The years from 1820 to 1880 were
the only years when the State o f Maine
was able to keep her smartest children
home and give them all something to
do, and not have to breed them for states
farther west, Illinois and Michigan, Wis
consin and Minnesota, Oregon and
Washington. Those states had to look
elsewhere, during that spell, for good
farmers and fishermen and boatbuilders
and lumbermen, and not rob the Maine
cradle o f its best lumbering and fishing
babies. ”
Robert P. Tristram Coffin,
Captain Abbv and Captain John

he only distinctive and viable Maine on its own terms lies in the
long term. And in the long term, the key to Maine’s well-being
will be much less land and investment capital than knowledge and skills.
No amount of land and capital can compensate for ignorance
of how to combine them to produce sound income and investment
opportunities. Yet limited amounts of land and capital can yield
profitable returns to imagination, knowledge, and skill. Land and
capital together are potential opportunity, made real by the skillful
application of knowledge. And income opportunities once realized
create skills and experience that are available to develop further
opportunities.

T
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If Maine is to take hold of events to its own advantage, Maine
people will require a host of technical and managerial skills at many
levels. It will need scores of land use planners, water and timber
resource planners, recreation and wildlife managers, hotel and resort
managers, small businessmen and managers of all kinds, financial
analysts, lawyers and engineers with specialties in land use practices,
and so on. And surely these skills will not be restricted to the pro
fessional level: wilderness guides, park and forest rangers, a host of
skilled tradesmen and service facility operators, all will be needed.
In the first instance, however, it is the more technical skills
that are required to generate opportunities for Maine. Indeed, one
of the sorry lessons of the federal manpower training programs of
recent years is that few things are more disillusioning than to train
a man into a skill for which there is no demand in the marketplace.
So the relationship between skills and opportunities is not so easy
as it first seems: not all skills generate their own opportunities, while
all opportunities demand specific skills for their creation.
Where is Maine to get the vast array of technical skills to gen
erate and sustain income opportunities from its land on a continuing
basis? In the short term, they are available in limited numbers both
within Maine and without, to be attracted to its opportunities by
imaginative leadership. Vermont in the 1960s demonstrated that
lower salaries are no barrier to professionals seeking a real alternative
to the dominant pattern of the nation’s growth. Land use planners,
engineers, and lawyers by the dozens settled in Vermont in that
decade, attracted by its potential for a different outcome for Amer
ica. Their presence has made the difference in placing Vermont in
the forefront among New England states in the areas of land use
planning and environmental protection.
Within Maine, the private business sector has never been un
responsive to its civic responsibilities. Perhaps more than most,
Maine’s own businessmen recognize the intimate relationship between
the health of their companies and the well-being of their communi
ties. Today businessmen everywhere are encountering demands for
performance that conflict directly with the traditional assumptions
of what business can do. What private business does best is to pro
duce under the discipline of a profit measure —hiring, firing, invest
ing, and selling on the basis of contributions to that measure. The
profit resulting from that discipline benefits the community in gen
eral through income and taxes, goods and services. To make any
more specific contribution than that, business as an institution re
quires profit incentives that reward desirable performance and
penalize the undesirable.
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No higher task exists for Maine government today than to
design tax and resource use policies that will stimulate the positive
participation of business in solving Maine’s economic and environ
mental problems. Government control of business activity is, in the
long run, a costly and inefficient approach —especially as compared
to business’ energetic pursuit of the public good on its own terms.
For its part, the business community could make its greatest
contribution to Maine’s future less by its traditional philanthropy
than by exploring creative ways to achieve private profit and public
good at the same time. How, for example, can the materials immedi
ately available in one of the nation’s great forests and one of the
world’s largest cement plants be brought together with modern
technology to produce sound, attractive housing at a reasonable cost
and profit in Maine? In the answer to that question lies more private
and public good for Maine than in any number of civic committee
assignments.
Whatever the efforts of other institutions, however, the knowl
edge and skills required to develop society’s resources thoughtfully
and to generate income and investment opportunities from them on
a continuing basis can come only from the university.
The University of Maine today has the deserved reputation of
being one of only two public institutions in Maine that really work.
(The other is the State Highway Department which, like public
works agencies everywhere, has fallen into some disrepute with the
gentry.) An original land grant college, the University has in general
built itself upon the best of the land grant traditions: broad public
access, public service, and practical education.
At the moment all of the nation’s universities are seeking new
directions in which to fulfill their purpose, if only because of the
new financial constraints upon them. Gone for good are the halcyon
days of the 1960s when no expenditure seemed too extravagant or
unwarranted, no program too luxurious or irrelevant to support it
self if it could. Those were the days when it was all too easy for any
university to drift aimlessly, producing college graduates for their
own (and their parents’) sake, allowing its staff to pursue narrow
professional concerns of personal advancement rather than any
directly responsive public role.
These sins may be forgiven a richly endowed private university
with a tolerant alumni constituency. But where the university’s
constituency is represented by a harried state legislature, the wages
of sin are more binding. In its last session the Maine Legislature
evidenced reluctance to continue the liberal funding it has provided
the University in the last decade. Perhaps the greatest part of this
reluctance is the growing feeling that Maine’s expenditures for higher
education go largely to create a skilled labor force for the rest of
the nation. A 1968 survey indicated, for instance, that 71 percent
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of the graduates of the University’s premier college of technology
were living and working outside Maine 20 years after graduation. Of
course, this figure obscures both the attractiveness of the college to
residents of other states and the fact that most of those 71 percent
are native Mainers who have found better lives for themselves else
where as a result of their education. One suspects that is why their
parents supported the University in the first place.
Like private business, universities are now being asked to per
form some of society’s work for which they are ill-equipped and
even incompetent. It is perhaps the price they are paying for the
affluence and prestige with which society has endowed them in
recent years. But if the business of business is business, the business
of the university is knowledge, its learning and teaching. And this
alone, with appropriate incentives, is what a university is competent
to deliver in the long run.

f the analysis presented in this paper is correct, there is a new
and literally indispensable role for the University to play in
creating the knowledge and the skills to take hold of economic events
in Maine, to convert them to income opportunities, and to fill the op
portunities with trained people who are sensitive to the limits of
Maine’s resources. Those events cut across economic and environ
mental and cultural considerations in Maine. The knowledge and
skills they demand scarcely respect traditional academic boundaries

I
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and professional jurisdictions. And, not least, the sources of federal
and foundation support for university needs today more than ever
favor neither those traditional boundaries, nor research unrelated to
society’s needs, nor slavish duplication of academic programs appro
priate to other times and places.
These several considerations recommend the creation of a dis
tinct Maine studies program within the University, designed as a
continuing focus and vehicle for Maine’s own needs in the broad
reaches of land use planning, land management, and community
development. Its purpose will be to maintain the tradition of the
land grant college in this new time for Maine - as the major source
of intellectual leadership and technical resources for the people of
Maine to achieve their social and economic goals.
To accomplish that purpose today, a program is required that
is multidisciplinary in its approach to problems, innovative in its
curriculum design and extension services to the community, finan
cially independent of the present academic divisions within the Uni
versity, and organized on each of its campuses with (specialties in the
different skills required for the development and protection of
Maine’s resources. It would become known in the first instance not
for the universality and purity of its concerns but for their usefulness
and responsiveness to Maine’s economic and environmental problems;
and beyond that, for what Maine’s answers to those problems have
to say to the rest of the nation and the world.
What might be the agenda of a Maine studies program? Over
time it will change with the needs of Maine itself. But in terms of
the forces now operating in Maine there are some priorities that
stand out.
In research, there is a long list of hard questions to ask about
the benefits of various public investments in Maine land, and the
costs of private investments. These are questions scarcely asked to
now in Maine. In the public sector the sole question is too often,
simply, how much will it cost? And in the private sector, how much
will it make? Seldom if ever is the other side of these questions con
sidered fully. In exploring these and other issues, a Maine studies
program would become the principal source of intellectual support
to a land bank, whose critical information needs were discussed
earlier. Knowledge is expensive. For reasons of economy alone, the
task must fall largely to the University to gather the experience of
Maine’s land uses, to evaluate their results, and to create specific
new knowledge, new techniques, new policies, and new legislation
to guide Maine’s economic development and environmental pro
tection.
In teaching, the task is to develop a program that will enable
Maine’s youth to learn something important about what is happen
ing in Maine, and to do something necessary for its future. Maine
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has much to learn and much to teach, and hardly all of it is in
schools. Perhaps Maine is the appropriate place to break out of the
passive mode of education prevailing in the nation’s universities and
to build a program based upon the ancient journeyman-apprentice
arrangement of teachers and students together mastering useful
crafts for society’s needs.
No better vehicle exists anywhere than the traditional extension
program, organized anew to deliver planning, financial, managerial,
organizational, and marketing skills to Maine’s local governments,
community development corporations, small businesses, and so on.
And no better training ground exists for Maine’s youth to prepare
for positions of full time responsibility for Maine’s future.
Nor need this program engage the energies and commitments
only of Maine’s youth. Maine’s greatest untapped resource in both
the areas of training and technical services is the growing legion of
retirees, natives and immigrants alike, whose lifetimes of experience
exceed all that is available elsewhere to Maine. How much of that
experience might be put to training and technical advice in occupa
tions that are supportive of sound land use is a question that needs
to be asked —for Maine’s sake and its retirees’, as well.
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D E M O N S T R A T IO N
P R O JE C T S
. . . . but there is
An ancient cellar there and stones
that bear
The mark o f fire which once meant
a home.
And men may come again. The
place is lonesome,
But men may want a lonesomeness
again . . . .
The island lies there ready for the
day,
The gulls are keeping it till man
returns.
Robert P. Tristram Coffin,
‘‘The Island ”, Salt Water Farm

hings are out of hand in Maine. The pace of recent events has
caught it unprepared to cope with them and their effects. This
is not surprising. Change has always been something that happened very
slowly in Maine, if at all. Now the size and momentum of national
forces are such that there is precious little Maine can do about their
basic character. What it can do is control the terms under which
those forces operate in Maine, and maneuver for its own preferred
advantage within the demands they impose.

T
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Today economic growth and change are borne along by re
sources that are beyond the command of individuals in Maine. Only
social institutions acting on behalf of Maine’s people and account
able to them can do the job at hand. Only they can buffer the drastic
effects in Mainers’ personal lives of rapid economic change. Only
they can curb the costs of growth and harness its benefits for Maine
as a whole.
The policies proposed in this paper include:
-a property tax program organized at the regional level in Maine;
-a land bank operating at the state and regional levels;
*community development corporations organized at the regional
and local levels; and
- a Maine studies program organized throughout the state’s public
university system.
Their purpose, together, is to develop the strength and competence
to take hold of events in Maine and bend them to Maine’s purposes
and advantage.
Events have their own force and momentum, however, that are
largely impervious to reason and analysis. That is what makes policy
and the promises of policy makers so untrustworthy. If these pro
posals are responsive to Maine’s present needs, what one may expect
is that they will provide a framework within which events will occur
to Mainers’ net benefit and advantage. And if they are effective, they
should demonstrate this in one or two limited, modest applications
in practice.
Wherever the “green revolution” has been successfully intro
duced in the poor nations of the world, for example, it has required
that a large number of new institutional connections be made, as
well as demonstration projects to show local farmers that these new
connections will work to their advantage.’ In addition to the improved
seed varieties that are the essence of the green revolution, an ample
supply of water, fertilizer, and information about their correct ap
plication must be present. These require that adequate credit and
extension services be available. And once the crop is harvested, suf
ficient marketing capacity must exist to prevent price declines that
will destroy incentives to grow the crop the following year. This, in
turn, requires that transportation and distribution facilities be in
place before the crop is in. And so it goes, the connections multi
plying outward until there is a system that supports the innovation
as a whole. Failure to comprehend each of the links and to coordi
nate them all means failure for the venture as a whole.
Similarly, the place for Maine to begin developing its compe
tence in land use planning and management is in one or two care
fully chosen demonstration projects. On these sites, all the institu
tions involved can be brought together, their connections explored,
their weaknesses corrected, and their strengths reinforced.
How is the site to be acquired? How is it to be developed, by
whom, and for what uses? How is construction to be financed?'
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Who is to build it? Who is to operate it? How are its profits to be
distributed and reinvested? What controls can a land bank exercise
wisely and unoppresively? How much advantage of the operation
can be taken by a regional or local development corporation? How
much assistance can the university provide in planning the develop
ment, preparing for its operation, and analyzing its results?
All of these questions and more must be answered in the con
text of real market demands on real Maine land. Those answers will
create knowledge and competence for the several institutions in
volved that will subsequently serve Maine’s interests at large. They
will provide firm evidence about the compatibility of sound profit
considerations and strict aesthetic and environmental standards in
Maine land development. And if the evidence is favorable, these
projects will be models for all subsequent public and private devel
opment in Maine.
In 1971 Sears Island was the subject of heated controversy over
the location of an oil refinery on its highlands. A professional survey
of the island indicates that its landform, soils, plant materials, water
table, and visual amentities all recommend its development as a residen
tial and recreational community. With deep water on both sides and
terrain that is suited to year-round recreational activities, Sears Island
affords a perfect opportunity for Maine to explore acceptable income
alternatives to both heavy industry and rampant commercialism in
the Penobscot Bay area. Connected directly to the mainland by a
passable causeway, it is a virgin oasis in the very heart of Maine’s
tourist country. It is close to airport facilities at Belfast and Bangor
and fine skiing facilities at Camden. And across Stockton Springs
Harbor is deep water surrounding Cape Jellison and its rail connection
over Bangor and Aroostook tracks to the Canadian Pacific Railway.
This linkage provides the possibility for dry cargo port facilities tied
into the same development project.
Away from the coast, the great forest tracts of Maine —their
wilderness, lakes, streams, and mountains —remain Maine’s greatest
resource for the future. Their restricted ownership and general inac
cessibility have kept them largely undeveloped to now, and their
income potential virtually unknown except for timber and pulp
purposes. Once it is established, the thoughtful development of their
greater potential will demand a degree of public-private cooperation
that is without precedent in Maine.
Today Scott Paper Company is exploring alternatives to wood
pulp operations on its 850,000 acres of land around Moosehead Lake.
Moosehead is already connected to Montreal and Quebec City by
the Canadian Pacific Railway. A collaborative development effort
between Scott and a Maine land bank could provide a singular oc
casion to open Maine’s inland resources on a limited, controlled
basis, to plan their alternative uses carefully, and to share the costs
and benefits fairly among all the people involved.
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carcely a dozen years ago the preeminent student of New
England’s politics remarked that “in few American states are
the reins of government more openly or completely in the hands of a
/ew leaders of economic interest groups than in Maine. [The lumber
and power interests], combined with the textile and shoe manu
facturers have done more than merely ‘influence’ Maine politics;
‘control’ is probably a more accurate term.” * He could not foresee
the coming decline of Maine’s traditional industries, the changing
economic circumstances in which Maine would soon find itself, and
the new consciousness among Mainers of the severe costs of large
corporate power and unbridled growth.
Today Maine testifies to the fact that the power of vested in
terests is vastly exaggerated compared to the gradual encroachment
of ideas. Not in the near run, surely, but sooner or later it is ideas
that make the difference in how people live. We are all the captives of
some defunct philosopher. Yet each of us prefers to go to hell his own
way. That’s what the struggle is all about.
If Maine is going to hell anyway, it may as well go on its own
terms. And if it is not, it will be because Mainers themselves took
events in hand, did what was necessary to turn them to their advan
tage, and somehow built a highroad for others to emulate between
the excesses of exploitation and regimentation alike.
Once upon a time not long ago, three generations of Maine
craftsmen wrought from raw pine, oak, pitch, and iron the worthi
est, most appealing sailing ships the world had yet seen. With one
eye to commerce and one to nature, they built vessels that deflected
harsh forces to human purposes and attained a level of art in the pro
cess. Not overnight, but one keel, one mast, one good ship at a time.

S

* Duane Lockard, New England State Politics, Chicago, 1959
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A MAINE MANIFEST....
being a list of particulars concerning the economic resources of Maine
. . . . together with a compendium o f remedies to convert those resources
to sound income opportunities for the worthy inhabitants of that region . . .
B eg in n in g with a disquisition upon Maine's present state of economic
health and how that health relates to the condition of the Mother Nation . . . .
all preceding a most discerning account of certain valuable resources in Maine
which, if properly cultivated, can bring a considerable measure of financial and
environmental independence to Maine . . . .
F ollow ed by diverse commentaries on the quality and desireability of
Maine land, that most treasured of natural assets . . . . together with some
musings upon the inability of the state’s governing institutions to turn that
asset to the greater benefit of Maine and its native population . . . .
A 11 o f which leads the esteemed reader to certain noteworthy proposals,
modestly made, together being knit into a design for preferred economic
growth in Maine . . . . along with sundry arguments that if these proposals are
implemented, the profits and protections to Maine’s land and people will not
be inconsiderable . . . .
R emedies, too, are offered to relieve the onerous burden of property
taxes in Maine . . . . to maintain the value o f Maine’s land for its several desireable uses . . . . to give the people o f Maine a choice among those uses and a
stake in their consequences . . . . and to engage the public university in the
timely husbanding of the state’s resources and the like instruction of its
youth . . . .
W hereupon it is finally submitted that the diverse connections among
these several devices may best be established upon one or two selected sites in
Maine, where all may observe at leisure the wisdom and felicity of their
construction . . . .
F o r which the entire volume provides numerous charts, graphs, data,
references, bibliography, and miscellaneous observations and niceties . . . all
of which affords the most meticulous reader every necessary assurance that
what he may purchase for one dollar and a half is indeed worth consider
ably more.

